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ABSTRACT. This Article investigates the normative and constitutional case for a particular
form of congressional delegation that is of increasing practical importance: delegations that give
agencies the power to deprive statutory provisions of legal force and effect, a power this Article
calls "administrative forbearance authority." Although legal scholars have recently noted the rise
of administrative forbearance authority, they have largely ignored how exactly such a power
might operate in the hands of the agency and the various governance functions it performs.
Without such knowledge, the case for administrative forbearance authority is necessarily
incomplete.
This Article thus makes two principal contributions to the literature. First, it describes the
variety of functions that administrative forbearance authority serves at the agency level, drawing
on the previously unexplored histories of various agencies' experience with such authority.
Second, it uses the descriptive account both to develop a fuller normative and constitutional case
for administrative forbearance authority and to illuminate the various circumstances in which
forbearance can be beneficially employed as a policy tool.
To defenders of delegation generally, this Article posits that there is no special reason to be
wary of administrative forbearance authority and that forbearance can be used as a governance
device in previously underappreciated ways. To critics who urge a stronger nondelegation
doctrine than the one we have today, I argue that there may be reasons to actually support
administrative forbearance in a world where delegations of the traditional type are unlikely to go
anywhere anytime soon.
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In 2015, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) reclassified
broadband Internet service providers (ISPs) - companies like Comcast and
Verizon -as common carriers under the Communications Act.' That decision,
heralded by many,' automatically subjected such providers to a range of
statutory obligations. At the same time, however, the Commission announced
it will "forbear from" - render inapplicable - many of these requirements. The
Commission can do so because of a provision in the Communications Act, little
known outside of communications-law circles, allowing the FCC to formally
deprive portions of the Act of their legal force.' In other words, the statute
expressly allows the Commission to render statutory requirements no longer
legally binding.
Delegations to agencies of the power to deprive statutory provisions of legal
force and effect-what this Article calls "administrative forbearance
authority"'- raise a set of questions distinct from those associated with
traditional delegations of authority to agencies to fill in the details of a
regulatory scheme. What roles does such an authority serve in the hands of an
agency? Do the traditional justifications for delegating authority to make law
also apply to delegations that allow an agency to relieve regulated parties of
their statutory obligations? How does such a power compare to other forms of
agency action, such as nonenforcement? Should we have more reason to fear
such delegations than we do delegations of the normal sort?
1. See Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 80 Fed. Reg. 19738 (Apr. 13, 2015) (to be
codified at 47 C.F.R. pts. 1, 8, 20).
2. President Obama, for example, called on the FCC to take such action in November 2014. See
Net Neutrality: President Obama's Plan for a Free and Open Internet, WHITE HOUSE,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/net-neutrality [http://perma.cc/3LB7-N70F]. The President
and others believe that, by reclassifying broadband ISPs, the Commission can (among other
things) craft a set of strong "net-neutrality" rules designed to prevent ISPs from using their
networks to favor certain Internet content providers over others. For more on net neutrality,
see infra note 121 and accompanying text.
3. 47 U.S.C. 5 16o (2012).
4. Although I will refer to such an authority as "forbearance authority," it goes by different
names in different statutory contexts. I will also refer occasionally to "negative" delegations
when distinguishing forbearance from the more traditional, "positive"-type delegations by
which an agency is given authority to create legal rules or define the subjects of regulation.
See R. Craig Kitchen, Negative Lawmaking Delegations: Constitutional Structure and
Delegations to the Executive of Discretionary Authority To Amend, Waive, and Cancel Statutory
Text, 40 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 525 (2013). A further terminological complexity involves the
relationship between forbearance and "waiver" or "variance." See infra notes 30-33 and
accompanying text (discussing differences between forbearance and traditional forms of
agency waiver or variance authority).
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Although the literature has begun to investigate these and other questions,s
it has yet to offer a full descriptive and normative evaluation of administrative
forbearance authority. This Article thus makes two principal contributions to
the literature. First, it describes the variety of functions that administrative
forbearance serves at the agency level, drawing on the ways the FCC and other
agencies have used their forbearance authority. Second, the Article uses this
descriptive account to mount a normative case for forbearance as a particular
form of delegation and to illuminate the range of circumstances in which it
might be used. It thus provides a robust defense of administrative forbearance
authority that is firmly grounded in both the realities of administration and
administrative-law theory.
The time is ripe for a fuller evaluation of forbearance authority. As many
have written,6 the current age is characterized by legislative gridlock in which
agencies face increasing pressure to "tailor" statutes that are out of date,
overbroad, or simply unworkable.' An expressly delegated power to ease or
eliminate statutory requirements, such as that held by the FCC, presents the
promise of much-needed regulatory flexibility.
Forbearance authority is also potentially more legitimate than other tools.
Judges and commentators have recently expressed concerns about different
kinds of agency actions - especially discretionary decisions not to enforce
s. Most importantly, David Barron and Todd Rakoff's article, In Defense of Big Waiver, in
addition to drawing attention to the phenomenon, delineates the reasons -largely sounding
in considerations of political economy-that negative delegations play an increasingly
important role in congressional lawmaking. See David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In
Defense ofBig Waiver, 113 COLUM. L. REv. 265 (2013). Barron and Rakoff also argue that such
delegations are generally constitutional under their reading of controlling Supreme Court
precedent. However, their article does not examine the various uses that forbearance serves
in the hands of an agency. For that reason, their work does not engage in the type of
functional defense of forbearance- focusing on the comparative advantages of agency
decision making-that I argue is important to its normative and constitutional status. See
infra notes 63-66 and accompanying text (discussing Barron and Rakoffs article in greater
detail). Similarly, two other pieces defend forbearance-like authority in particular contexts
but do not engage in a full analysis of such a power based on the traditional administrative-
law justifications for delegating authority to agencies. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Federalism
by Waiver After the Health Care Case, in THE HEALTH CARE CASE: THE SUPREME COURT'S
DECISION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 124 (Gillian Metzger et al. eds., 2013); Jonathan H. Adler,
Let Fifty Flowers Bloom: Transforming the States into Laboratories ofEnvironmental Policy, AEI
FEDERALISM PROJECT (2001), http://heartland.org/sites/defaultfiles/letjfifty.pdf [http://
perma.cc/43X5-ALEH]. Both pieces are largely concerned with the vertical-federalism
implications of forbearance, an issue I largely will bracket.
6. See infra Section I.A.
7. See, e.g., Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PA. L. REv. 1
(2014); Michael S. Greve & Ashley C. Parrish, Administrative Law Without Congress, 22 GEO.




certain applications of federal statutes-that border on unilateral executive
lawmaking.' An express forbearance authority avoids many of the criticisms
leveled against these other forms of executive lawmaking: forbearance involves
the exercise of a power that Congress explicitly gave to an agency, and an
agency's exercise of its forbearance authority triggers procedures that result in
more opportunities for judicial review and public comment than decisions not
to enforce a statute.
That said, forbearance does raise its own set of normative issues, which
have been thrust to the fore by forbearance-like provisions contained in high-
profile programs such as the No Child Left Behind Act,9 as well as by Mitt
Romney's presidential campaign pledge to dismantle the Affordable Care Act
through executive action."o For one, the traditional policy justifications for
delegating authority to an administrative agency -most prominently, agencies'
greater expertise and flexibility vis-4-vis Congress - apply less clearly to
administrative forbearance authority. With "normal" delegations, the typical
narrative is that Congress wants to do this or that but isn't quite sure how and
thus delegates power to an agency. Among other reasons, we tolerate
delegation because the agency is, under the received view, often in a better
position than Congress to know the precise course to chart and can more easily
change direction if necessary. But with negative delegations, Congress has
already set the requirements and defined to whom (or what) they apply, at
least using broad strokes." For that reason, the traditional story we tell for
8. See, e.g., Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA (UARG), 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2466 (2014) (vacating
partly the EPA's greenhouse-gas rules and reaffirming "the core administrative-law
principle that an agency may not rewrite clear statutory terms to suit its own sense of how
the statute should operate"); Texas v. United States, No. B-14-254, 2015 WL 648579, at *50
(S.D. Tex. Feb. 16, 2015) (enjoining President Obama's immigration initiatives and stating
that the President's policies do "not represent mere inadequacy" in enforcing the
immigration statutes but rather "complete abdication" of its statutory responsibility);
Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama Administration's Nonenforcement
of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEx. L. REv. 781 (2013);
Jeffrey A. Love & Arpit K. Garg, Presidential Inaction and the Separation of Powers, 112 MICH.
L. REv. 1195 (2014); Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L.
REv. 671, 673 (2014).
9. See No Child Left Behind Act, 20 U.S.C. § 7861(a) (2012).
io. See Karen Kaplan, Romney Says He'll Undo Obama Healthcare Reform on Day i. Can He?,
L.A. TIMEs (Oct. 30, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2oi2/oct/30/news/la-heb-president
-romney-affordable-care-act-2o121o30 [http://perma.cc/L5JZ-UPEU].
ii. "Broad strokes" is important here. Negative delegations will often introduce a kind of two-
way ratchet, under which the agency has authority both to flesh out the statutory
requirements themselves and to dispense with those requirements altogether. The
Communications Act, which contains a number of specific requirements and an equal or
greater number of capacious ones allowing broad agency discretion, is a good example. For
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"normal" delegations does not seem, at least at first glance, to apply with full
force to forbearance-like delegations.
Scholars have also recently raised questions about the propriety of
forbearance-type delegations. Law professor and historian Philip Hamburger
has called an express agency power to nullify statutory requirements
"astonishing even by administrative standards."" Another scholar has written
that conferring negative-lawmaking authority on an agency "amounts to an
abdication of Congress's core legislative functions."" And writing at the
Volokh Conspiracy blog, Professor David Post recently penned that it is
"[h]ard for [him] to believe that" such provisions "can pass constitutional
muster; it's like a repeal process, but one not involving Congressional action."'
For some, agency action formally dispensing with legal requirements simply
seems more "legislative" than other types of agency action. Indeed, a majority
of the Supreme Court came close to endorsing this position in Clinton v. City of
New York, which invalidated the Line Item Veto Act."s Under this view,
forbearance authority is constitutionally suspect either because it impermissibly
delegates power to agencies or because it violates Article I, Section 7's
bicameralism and presentment requirements."
Even apart from these formal legal concerns, some have voiced alarm that
forbearance-type delegations are more likely to be used by agencies in nefarious
ways - perhaps to override the will of Congress or to grant regulatory breaks to
powerful groups. 7 In an essay noting the rise of what he called "government
most of the analysis below, what is important is that forbearance allows the agency to reduce
requirements below the statutory minima, however insubstantial they may be.
12. PHILIP HAMBURGER, Is ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 121 (2014).
13. Leslie M. Kelleher, Separation of Powers and Delegations ofAuthority To Cancel Statutes in the
Line Item Veto Act and the Rules Enabling Act, 68 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 395, 435 (2000).
14. David Post, Can a Federal Agency Declare "Regulatory Bankruptcy"?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY
(Oct. 2, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.conVnews/volokh-conspiracy/wp/201 4 /10/02
/can-a-federal-agency-declare-regulatory-bankruptcy [http://perma.cc/JQS8-25RMI.
15. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 436 (1998). For a discussion of how close the
Court came, see infra notes 40-49 and accompanying text.
16. U.S. CONsT. art. I, 5 7, cl. 2; see HAMBURGER, supra note 12, at 120-27 (condemning agencies'
power to suspend provisions of the law); Kitchen, supra note 4 (considering the
constitutionality of such delegations and concluding that they are, in fact, unlawful).
Previous work has considered similar questions in the specific context of the Line Item Veto
Act. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Lessons from a Line Item Veto Law, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
1659 (1997); Thomas 0. Sargentich, The Future of the Item Veto Act, 83 IOWA L. REV. 79
(1997); see also infra Section I.B (discussing the Line Item Veto Act).
17. See, e.g., HAMBURGER, supra note 12, at 127; Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 236 ("Liberal critics
express concern for statutory erosion. They contend that waivers have been used to
undermine hard-won statutory requirements that would otherwise bind states to provide




by waiver," for example, Richard Epstein writes that, in part because of the
potential for favoritism created by a broad power in the Executive to nullify
statutory requirements, such authority represents a "particularly dangerous
form of government power."a
This Article addresses these issues in the following ways. First, it develops
an understanding of the roles played by forbearance authority, and, based on
this descriptive account, reveals that the primary justifications for delegations
to an expert agency apply with full force to "negative" or forbearance-type
delegations. Second, the descriptive account reveals that forbearance, like the
more familiar authority to fill in the details of statutes, is properly viewed as
implementing (and not overriding) the statute Congress has written, which
includes the delegation itself. Thus, an agency exercising forbearance authority
no more exercises a purely legislative power to "repeal" the law than an agency
filling in the gaps exercises a legislative power to enact law. Finally, in practice,
agencies' histories with administrative forbearance power do not reveal them to
be behaving in particularly problematic ways. Instead, agencies often use
forbearance authority to address perennial governance problems that Congress
anticipated when it included the delegation in a statute. Of course, the potential
for abuse remains, just as it does for any type of government power. But these
histories indicate that forbearance need not be viewed as a particularly
troubling form of delegation.
This Article does more than respond defensively to various critiques of
forbearance, however. It also highlights several underappreciated benefits of
forbearance-like delegations, providing a roadmap for policymakers who are
considering when and in what circumstances to include forbearance provisions.
The descriptive account shows that forbearance can be used as a policy tool in
seemingly counterintuitive ways. For example, Congress has used forbearance
as an anticapture device, allowing it to set an initial proregulatory baseline
while permitting the agency some flexibility to depart downward from that
baseline. Similarly, even though forbearance might appear to be a form of
deregulation, forbearance actually can be used in a range of circumstances to
facilitate more socially beneficial regulation than might otherwise be possible.
Forbearance-type delegations also have underappreciated ancillary benefits for
the administrative process. Forbearance may substitute for other types of
agency action, such as agency nonenforcement decisions, that pose graver
Kitchen, supra note 4, at 584 ("Negative lawmaking by the executive ... is also problematic
because it allows for favoritism and unequal application of the law."); Kitchen, supra note 4,
at 586 (worrying that negative delegations allow "presidential policy to override the difficult
policy compromises reflected in statutory text").
18. Richard A. Epstein, Govemment by Waiver, NAT'LAFF. 40 (2011), http://www.nationalaffairs
.com/doclib/2onro317epstein.pdf [http://perma.cc/YLQ4-QB74].
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normative concerns. In addition, a number of the standard critiques of
delegation apply with less force to forbearance-like authority. Thus, to the
extent forbearance-type delegations can stand in for garden-variety positive
delegations, even critics of delegation generally may have reason to support
them.
The argument proceeds in four parts. Part I sets up the problem. In the
current age of congressional gridlock, scholars and politicians have increasingly
turned their attention to the executive branch for potential solutions.
Administrative forbearance is thus a particularly attractive tool at this point in
time. Yet it still is only partially understood.
Part II turns to the task of describing the functions that administrative
forbearance serves in the hands of an agency. A forbearance option can be used
to address familiar problems, such as when a statutory requirement has
become unnecessary or counterproductive (the problem of statutory
obsolescence), or when the application of a requirement in a particular setting
does not seem justified in light of the reasons for the statute (the problem of
overinclusiveness or "fit"). But there are also a number of less obvious ways an
agency can use forbearance to pursue beneficial regulatory ends. Somewhat
paradoxically, one such use is to enable regulation: forbearance can be deployed
to selectively regulate in contexts where applying a set of statutory
requirements across the board would be unwise.
Part III pivots from the descriptive to the normative. Section III.A applies
the primary policy-based justifications for administrative delegation to the case
of forbearance-type delegations and argues that those justifications apply with
equal force to forbearance authority. Section III.B then shows that agency
action pursuant to forbearance authority is superior to other forms of agency
action, such as statutory nonenforcement, for which it may substitute. Because
enforcement discretion often operates "underground," shielded from public
view, policymaking through enforcement is vulnerable to criticism on process
grounds: nonenforcement often is not transparent and can be used to evade the
Administrative Procedure Act's (APA) notice-and-comment requirements,
escape judicial "arbitrariness" review, and limit opportunities for cost-benefit
analysis. By contrast, forbearance decisions typically are made openly, are
immediately appealable to the courts, and are announced in a form amenable to
calculating the relevant costs and benefits.
Section III.C then addresses various objections that might be lodged
against administrative forbearance. An important theme of this Section is that,
in many cases, the objections to traditional positive delegations apply with less
force to negative delegations. After all, when it delegates forbearance authority,
Congress is the one responsible for setting the regulatory default. As I explain,
agency deviations from the default often are easier to monitor and address than




Finally, Part IV considers the promises and limits of forbearance as a
policymaking tool. Section IV.A describes the conditions under which
Congress should include forbearance authority in its statutes and under which
we might be skeptical of forbearance as a normative or policy matter. Section
IV.B then invokes recent regulatory controversies involving the Voting Rights
Act (VRA) and the Clean Air Act to describe how a forbearance authority
might operate in areas in which it currently does not exist.
1. BACKGROUND
A. Old Statutes, "Hyper"-Statutes, and Executive Policymaking
According to many scholars, agencies - and the executive branch more
generally" -are in a tough spot. The current political climate, marked by
congressional gridlock and extreme partisanship, has hampered legislative
policymaking.' For any number of reasons, Congress increasingly lets "old"
statutes that are out of step with current realities languish on the books.' In
the rare political moments where Congress produces legislation, the legislation
tends to be sprawling and, at least according to some, ill-conceived or even
"incoherent" -a trend toward what one recent article calls "hyper-
legislation."' In this climate, agencies are increasingly responsible for making
sense of that legislation. The result is what two scholars have recently
described as a significant uptick in executive "policymaking in the absence of
Congress."' In particular, agencies face growing pressure to "tailor" statutes -
ig. I use "executive branch" broadly to refer to traditional executive-branch agencies,
independent agencies such as the FCC and SEC, and the President and his staff.
20. See generally Freeman & Spence, supra note 7, at 15-16 ("[T]he current partisan and
ideological makeup of Congress renders [regulatory legislative] action much less likely, all
else equal, than at any time in the modern regulatory era."); Greve & Parrish, supra note 7,
at 502 (arguing that Congress "consistently fails to update or revise old statutes even when
those enactments are manifestly outdated or, as actually administered, have assumed
contours that the original Congress never contemplated and the current Congress would not
countenance"); Richard H. Pildes, Romanticizing Democracy, Political Fragmentation, and the
Decline of American Government, 124 YALE L.J. 804 (2014) (attempting to "diagnos[e] the
causes of government's limited capacity to function effectively").
21. See Freeman & Spence, supra note 7, at 8 ("Congress's capacity to react to changed
circumstances by lawmaking has diminished sharply over time .....
22. Greve & Parrish, supra note 7, at 502.
23. Freeman & Spence, supra note 7, at 17.
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using enforcement discretion or otherwise - to address real governance
concerns. 4
Such agency action seems almost inevitable, especially in the current
environment.' If Congress's statutes pose serious governance problems that
Congress may not be prepared or able to address, the task of working out those
problems often will fall, for good or ill, to the agencies charged with
administering the statutes. However, these agency-centered responses to
congressional dysfunction pose potential legitimacy issues: most fundamentally,
are these exercises of power lawful in the absence of express congressional
approval? Questions like this have vexed lawyers and scholars in the debate
over President Obama's immigration policies, for instance. And if recent
history is an indication, they will continue to plague administrative-law
practice for years to come.
B. A Way Out? Agency Forbearance Authority
Because of the governance problems posed by congressional gridlock,
administrative forbearance authority -by which Congress grants agencies the
express power to deprive the laws it passes of legal force and effect' -may be
24. See Michael Sant'Ambrogio, The Extra-Legislative Veto, 102 GEO. L.J. 351 (2014) (exploring
situations in which the Executive exercises a postenactment "veto" over legislation); infra
notes 158-161 and accompanying text (expanding on the issue of Executive enforcement
discretion). See generally Freeman & Spence, supra note 7 (discussing congressional
dysfunction and its relationship to agency policymaking).
25. See, e.g., Freeman & Spence, supra note 7, at 5 ("Our point is simply that typical statutory
obsolescence made worse by atypical congressional dysfunction puts tremendous pressure
on agencies to do something to address new problems, making that central challenge all the
more acute." (emphasis omitted)); Greve & Parrish, supra note 7, at 503 ("Knowing that
there is no going back to Congress, agencies will be tempted to improvise policies lacking
congressional authority, sometimes well beyond the limits of their organic statutes and of
conventional legal canons.").
26. See, e.g., Memorandum from the Office of Legal Counsel to the Sec'y of Homeland Sec. &
the Counsel to the President (Nov. 19, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc
/opinions/attachments/2o14/1x/20/201 4 -11-19-auth-prioritize-removal.pdf [http://perma.cc
/ML85-FFDK]; Jack Balkin, Symposium on Administrative Reform of Immigration Law-
Collected Posts, BALKINIZATION (Nov. 26, 2014, 5:42 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2o04/11
/symposium-on-administrative-reform-of_26.html [http://perma.cc/9AJR-G28Z].
27. This power would allow agencies to essentially take portions of statutes off the books by
rendering them legally unenforceable. Agencies might exercise such a power in a variety of
ways, depending on how the delegatory provision is worded. Agencies might be able to
exercise such a power broadly, declaring a particular provision inoperative in all cases. Or
the power might be exercised to exempt only a particular class of regulated entities or
persons from the law's scope. For example, a statute might instruct that the EPA shall
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particularly appealing to modern policymakers. Of course, forbearance does
not itself solve the problem of gridlock. Because forbearance is an express
power, Congress itself must pass legislation to grant it. Nonetheless, there is
reason to think that Congress may be more able to pass legislation involving
broad forbearance provisions than legislation lacking such provisions: as Judge
(then Professor) David Barron and Professor Todd Rakoff have noted,
forbearance-like delegations may help facilitate compromise on legislation,
especially in the current political environment.8
Administrative forbearance is distinct from other kinds of agency power
that it resembles. It is different from enforcement discretion in that it operates
to formally nullify statutory requirements on a prospective basis, at least if not
reinstated by the agency during a subsequent rulemaking. It is also different
from, though related to, longstanding concepts such as administrative waivers
and variances. Traditionally, waiver has referred to agencies' ability to waive
their own regulations, not the requirements contained in a statute."o Some
statutes, however, do contain provisions allowing agencies to waive statutory
requirements in exceptional circumstances and in particular cases-often,
though not always, when national security is at issue." Similarly, statutes may
allow agencies to grant variances from statutory or regulatory requirements;
these variances allow the agency to make such requirements more or less strict
for a particular regulated party." Forbearance is different. While waivers and
variances tend to involve one-off exceptions based on facts particular to the
regulated entity involved, forbearance operates on the wholesale level,
resembling the exercise of prospective policymaking. With forbearance, in
other words, an agency decides based on shared facts that a statutory
requirement should be eliminated across the board or with respect to an entire
category of regulated entity."
regulate greenhouse-gas emissions, but simultaneously allow the EPA to render that
requirement inapplicable to certain classes or categories of polluters.
28. See Barron & Rakoff, supra note 5, at 306-09.
29. Cf Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA (UARG), 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2445 (2014) (distinguishing
the exercise of enforcement discretion from agency action that "purports to alter . . .
requirements and to establish with the force of law that otherwise-prohibited conduct will
not violate the [statute]").
30. See generally Jim Rossi, Waivers, Flexibility, and Reviewability, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1359
(1997) (discussing the issues with such waivers).
p. See Barron & Rakoff, supra note 5, at 276-77 (collecting examples of statutes with waiver
provisions).
32. See, e.g., Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116 (1985) (discussing
the variance provision of the Clean Water Act).
33. Of course, there may be difficult issues at the border, such as when a "waiver" or "variance"
provision is so broadly written that it may be used, in effect, to forbear from a requirement
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An expressly granted authority to void statutory requirements solves the
particular legitimacy problem posed by unilateral executive action. When an
agency acts pursuant to a congressionally delegated power to deprive statutory
provisions of legal force or effect, the agency is not going it alone but rather
exercising authority granted by Congress. In these cases, the executive branch's
power is traditionally at its apex.'
Although an expressly granted authority to deprive statutory provisions of
legal force and effect is a solution to one problem, it also raises another: that of
delegation. Simply put, does the Constitution permit Congress to grant agencies
such a power? And normatively, as opposed to strictly legally, should we allow
Congress to provide agencies with the express authority to override statutes
that Congress itself has passed?
The answers to these questions are unresolved, and the literature on
delegation thus far has not fully addressed them. As a purely doctrinal matter,
it is indeed unclear whether current law allows for such delegations. It is true,
of course, that Congress has nearly unfettered ability to grant agencies the
power to promulgate rules with binding legal force. Such "positive" lawmaking
delegations -delegations of the authority to make law -are valid as long as the
delegation supplies an "intelligible principle" to guide the agency's lawmaking
discretion."s And the Court has upheld, over the years, several laws containing
intelligible principles as vague as the "public interest.", 6
In theory, the "intelligible-principle" test should apply no differently to
negative delegations than to the more traditional positive variety. The
intelligible-principle test focuses on the scope of discretion granted to an
agency; it is satisfied as long as the agency's discretion does not amount to a
limitless, truly "legislative"-type power. In terms of the agency's discretion, a
congressional direction that an agency may regulate greenhouse-gas emissions
in toto. Indeed, forbearance is defined by its functional characteristics and not its label,
which has varied widely across statutes. Barron and Rakoff deal with this issue by
distinguishing between "little waiver" and "big waiver," the latter category closely
resembling what I am calling forbearance. See Barron & Rakoff, supra note 5, at 276-78. For
reasons of clarity, I have chosen not to employ their terminology. Because forbearance
differs from traditional waiver and variance powers in important ways, labeling it as a form
of waiver risks confusion.
34. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
35. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) ("[W]e repeatedly have
said that when Congress confers decision-making authority upon agencies Congress must
'lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized
to [act] is directed to conform.'" (second alteration in original) (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr.,
& Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928))).




if doing so would be in the public interest is the same as a direction that an
agency shall regulate greenhouse-gas emissions unless doing so would be
contrary to the public interest." The only difference between these cases is the
default state (regulation or no regulation), an issue about which the
intelligible-principle test is theoretically agnostic."
The rub comes with the Supreme Court's decision in Clinton v. City of New
York." That decision invalidated the Line Item Veto Act, which allowed the
President to "cancel" certain kinds of spending items and tax benefits after they
were formally signed into law.40 After President Clinton exercised that power,
the Supreme Court struck down the Act, stating that "[i]n both legal and
practical effect, the President has amended two Acts of Congress by repealing a
portion of each.""
Scholars have debated the meaning of Clinton, which was famously cryptic.
They have disagreed, for instance, about whether the result rested on
Presentment Clause grounds, as the Court claimed, or whether the case was
really a disguised application of the nondelegation doctrine instead.4 And
regarding the scope of the decision, some scholars have argued that Clinton is
best read as essentially limited to its peculiar facts. In particular, Barron and
Rakoff have argued that the Court's real concern lay in the five-day limitation
on the President's exercise of his cancellation authority.43 In their view, the
37. Indeed, a case can be made that the agency is in fact more constrained in the second example
than in the first. See infra Section III.C.i.
38. Here is another way of articulating the same point. In the hypothetical above, Congress is
not really saying that the agency "shall" regulate greenhouse gases when it simultaneously
gives the agency authority to dispense with regulation altogether. Instead, Congress is
giving the agency authority either to regulate greenhouse gases or not, but the legal rule is
designed so that regulation is the default state until the agency acts.
39. 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
4o. Id. at 436. The President had to cancel provisions within five days of signing a bill, and had
to make certain determinations -namely, that the exercise of his authority would "reduce
the Federal budget deficit," "not impair any essential Government functions," and "not
harm the national interest" -regarding the canceled items. Id. (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 691(a) (3)
(Supp. II 1994)). The canceled items would then be deprived of "'legal force or effect,'"
unless the majority of both Houses passed a "disapproval bill" disapproving of the
cancellations. Id. at 437 (quoting 2 U.S.C. 5 691e(4)(B)-(C) (Supp. 111994)).
41. Id. at 438.
42. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2366 (2001)
(concluding that, in light of the weakness of the Presentment Clause analysis, "[t]he real
question in the case . . . was whether the power granted to the President constituted an
impermissible delegation").
43. See Barron & Rakoff, supra note 5, at 31s-18. In addition, other aspects of the Act may have
appeared as uniquely nefarious end-runs around constitutionally required lawmaking
procedures. For instance, the President could nearly simultaneously sign a bill and then
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five-day limitation meant that the delegation in question could not have been
based on the traditional justifications for delegating authority to the Executive
(such as expertise), and was "thus proof of abdication, pure and simple."'
Outside of such "extreme cases," however, Barron and Rakoff argue that
Clinton leaves plenty of room for negative-type delegations.4s
While Barron and Rakoff make a persuasive case for a narrow reading of
Clinton, a broader reading may also be plausible and is supported by several
other aspects of the Court's opinion.46 For example, Clinton repeatedly noted,
without reference to the five-day limitation or any other feature unique to the
Line Item Veto Act, that a cancellation effectively "amend[ed] or repeal[ed]"
legislation by depriving a statutory provision of legal force or effect, something
the Court appeared to believe violated the Presentment Clause ipso facto.'
Moreover, in distinguishing prior cases upholding forbearance-like
delegations, the Court stressed two points. First, the Court explained that its
decisions had only upheld negative delegations in the context of international
trade, an area in which the Executive is afforded both greater deference and
greater discretion. 4 Second, the Court emphasized the extremely limited
nature of the Executive's discretion under prior negative delegations, which the
Court characterized as more akin to factfinding than policymaking." Clinton's
discussion on these points can thus be interpreted to suggest that something
more than a lax form of the "intelligible-principle" test applies to negative
delegations. This broader reading of Clinton cuts against negative delegations
more generally, perhaps even prohibiting them entirely.
Some scholars have pushed this point even further. Most prominently,
Philip Hamburger suggests that an executive power to deprive legal provisions
of legal force is fundamentally at odds with the separation of powers embodied
cancel various provisions, and the Act called the cancellation mechanism a Line Item Veto.
See Clinton, 524 U.S. at 469 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The title of the Line Item Veto Act,
which was perhaps designed to simplify for public comprehension, or perhaps merely to
comply with the terms of a campaign pledge, has succeeded in faking out the Supreme
Court.").
44. Barron & Rakoff, supra note 5, at 317.
4s. Id. at 318.
46. See Kitchen, supra note 4, at 532-33 (urging a broad reading of Clinton to condemn negative
delegations generally).
47. 524 U.S. at 442.
48. See id. at 445.
49. See id. ("[W]hen enacting the statutes discussed in Field, Congress itself made the decision
to suspend or repeal the particular provisions at issue upon the occurrence of particular
events subsequent to enactment, and it left only the determination of whether such events




by the Constitution.so For him, a power to "waive" (or "dispense with")
statutory requirements for individual parties is a kind of "extralegal" power
that is not legislative, judicial, or executive in nature and cannot be legally
authorized, even by the legislature.s' Hamburger believes that a more broad-
based power to "suspend" legal requirements rests with the legislature, but that
power is nondelegable unless a constitution specifically authorizes its
delegation.s" It is unclear in which category Hamburger would place the
various forbearance provisions discussed in this Article. In any event, his
critiques share a common premise - namely, that when an agency lifts statutory
requirements, it is doing something categorically different than the executive
task of implementing legislation as written. 3
In addition, R. Craig Kitchen, drawing on Clinton, argues that Article I,
Section 7's bicameralism and presentment requirements mean "[t]hat
[statutory] text should not have its legal force or effect undone through the
exercise of unilateral executive discretion."' In particular, Kitchen worries that
the minority-protective nature of Article I, Section 7 will be undermined if
"specific compromises in the negated statutory text" are undone by the
Executive through the exercise of forbearance authority.ss As he elaborates:
The Article I, Section 7 test of Clinton, properly understood, represents
fidelity to a highly specific constitutional bargain regarding the
procedure for lawmaking. . . . Negating or altering the legal force or
effect of that text outside of bicameralism and presentment risks
undermining whatever bargain was made for that specific text, and it
does so without the input of the parties who made the bargain and
So. HAMBURGER, supra note 12, at 120-27. Although Hamburger's discussion on this point is
couched in terms of "waiver," some of his arguments cut more broadly against a
forbearance-like authority to "suspend," "modify," or "repeal" statutory provisions through
regulation.
s1. Id. at 78-79.
52. Id.
ss. Other parts of Hamburger's argument cut more broadly against positive as well as negative
delegations and would, if accepted, lead to the dismantling of much of the administrative
state. For a critique of various aspects of Hamburger's argument, see Adrian Vermeule, No,
93 TEx. L. REv. 1547 (2015) (reviewing HAMBURGER, supra note 12). But Hamburger gives
particular reasons for why forbearance-like delegations are unconstitutional, reasons that
might be accepted without necessarily accepting Hamburger's broader critique. The point
here is only that there is no particular reason to reject forbearance-like delegations as
opposed to any other kind of delegation.
54. Kitchen, supra note 4, at 586.
ss. Id. at 59o.
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without providing them any opportunity to demand compromise in
other areas in exchange for their agreement to the change.s6
Scholars are thus divided over whether negative delegations are
constitutional. As the foregoing discussion suggests, much of the scholarship
on negative delegations has focused on the proper interpretation of the Court's
opinion in Clinton. In doing so, however, the literature has yet to fully explore
the constitutional case for negative delegations.
C. The Need for a Functional Analysis
What has been missing from the small but growing literature on
forbearance-type delegations is, in part, a fuller understanding of how such
delegations operate within the overall system of government. Even defenders
of negative delegations treat them as a new phenomenon, and a potentially
irregular one at that.Y But, though agency forbearance authority has operated
mostly in the shadows until recently, it is not so new.
This lack of knowledge contributes to some of the uneasiness about
negative delegations. The propriety of positive delegations has rested in part on
a set of functional considerations that depend on a particular understanding of
the roles played by Congress and agencies in the policymaking process.5
56. Id. at 592.
S7. See Barron & Rakoff, supra note 5, at 269-71.
s8. See Margaret H. Lemos, The Other Delegate: Judicially Administered Statutes and the
Nondelegation Doctrine, 81 S. CAL. L. REv. 405, 464 (20o8) ("[C]ontemporary debate about
delegations of lawmaking authority tends to have less to do with doctrine than with the
practical necessity and desirability of the administrative model."); see also Thomas W.
Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section i: From Nondelegation to Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM.
L. REV. 2097, 2158 (2004) ("The policies that have been advanced in support of broad
delegation provide significant support for lax delegation relative to strict nondelegation.");
Rafael I. Pardo & Kathryn A. Watts, The Structural Exceptionalism of Bankruptcy
Administration, 60 UCLA L. REV. 384, 423 (2012) ("[C]ourts have routinely condoned
relatively standardless delegations of policymaking authority to agencies (and have been
willing to give the nondelegation doctrine no more than lip service) because of functionalist
considerations that make agencies well suited to receive and exercise delegations of
policymaking power."). See generally JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE:
USING PUBLIC CHOICE To IMPROVE PUBLIC LAw 148-57 (1997) (discussing the benefits of
decision making by agencies); David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the
Administrative State, 89 GEO. L.J. 97 (2000) (providing an argument, grounded in the
language of public choice, for delegating policymaking authority to agencies). The
conclusion that positive delegations are supported by functional considerations is often
paired with a concern that judicial efforts to police the boundaries of lawful congressional
delegation will prove unworkable because some amount of executive policymaking




As Rafael Pardo and Kathryn Watts recently put it, "Administrative law
teaches that broad delegations of policymaking power to agencies may well be
desirable -and, hence, will generally be tolerated as a constitutional matter -
because of a variety of functional considerations relating to agencies'
institutional structures and capacities."5 ' The prodelegation position has (often
implicitly) assumed that Congress and agencies perform particular,
complementary roles in the lawmaking process. Both critics and defenders of
broad congressional delegations assume that Congress does not engage in
detailed legislative drafting for various reasons -for example, the costs
associated with drafting detailed legislation, a desire to harness agency
expertise in fleshing out policy details, or, more nefariously, a desire to shift
blame for hard choices onto others, such as the President.o According to one
metaphor, a decision to leave a statute "incomplete" -and allow an agency (or
court) to fill in the relevant details - is similar to the decision made by
contracting parties to write an incomplete contract." Whatever Congress's
reasons for writing vaguely worded laws, however, the agency's role in such
often is explained on the ground of judicial (in)competence."); see also MARTIN H. REDISH,
THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL STRUCTURE 136 (1995) ("[T]hose in charge of
enforcement of a statute will necessarily have to exercise a certain degree of latitude and
discretion in deciding exactly when and how to apply the broader legislative directive to a
specific set of circumstances. At what point that latitude unconstitutionally spills over into
the category of legislation, rather than merely execution, will not always be obvious.").
s9. Pardo & Watts, supra note 58, at 423. This particular conception of the Congress-agency
partnership was evident as early as J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, where the
Supreme Court first articulated the modern version of the intelligible principle standard.
J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928). There, in upholding
Congress's delegation to the Executive of the power to fix tariffs for certain goods, the Court
remarked that "Congress seems to have doubted that the information in its possession" was
sufficient to set rates by itself and that Congress had also "apprehended that . . , changing
conditions" might make adjustments to the rates necessary. Id. at 404-05. Turning to the
constitutionality of Congress's choice, the Court stated that "[i]n determining what it may
do in seeking assistance from another branch, the extent and character of that assistance
must be fixed according to common sense and the inherent necessities of the governmental
co-ordination." Id. at 4o6; see also id. at 407-08 ("If Congress were to be required to fix every
rate, it would be impossible to exercise the power at all. Therefore, common sense requires
that in the fixing of such rates, Congress may provide a Commission ... to fix those rates . .
. all in accord with a general rule that Congress first lays down, that rates shall be just and
reasonable considering the service given, and not discriminatory."). The Court thought that
the greater expertise, information, and flexibility of the executive branch were plainly
relevant to the constitutional nondelegation inquiry.
60. See Matthew C. Stephenson, Statutory Interpretation by Agencies, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAw 286-90 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O'Connell eds.,
2010) (discussing these and other possibilities).
61. See Scott Baker & Kimberly D. Krawiec, The Penalty Default Canon, 72 GEo. WASH. L. REv.
663 (2004).
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situations is clear. The agency makes rules governing situations where
Congress has not spoken. It is here, in filling in the policy details, where
agencies' greater expertise, flexibility, and the like are usually brought to
bear.2
But the functional considerations supporting delegations of negative-
lawmaking authority to agencies are less readily grasped. With negative
delegations, Congress specifies certain requirements and gives an agency broad
power to dispense with those requirements. To return to the contract
metaphor, this type of legislation resembles a contract in which the contracting
parties specify many details of their transaction while inserting a broad force
majeure clause allowing a court to dispense with the contract's terms under
certain circumstances. Yet little is known about what agencies are to do, and
what they in fact do, when given such an authority.
Existing defenses of forbearance authority are thus necessarily incomplete.
To date, the most thorough defense of forbearance-like authority has been
supplied by Barron and Rakoff.6 ' Apart from drawing attention to the
phenomenon of forbearance and providing their own interpretation of the
Court's decision in Clinton, Barron and Rakoff helpfully catalogue the reasons,
sounding in considerations of political economy, that Congress increasingly
delegates forbearance authority to administrative agencies.* In their telling,
forbearance is a salutary development largely because it facilitates lawmaking
by allowing Congress to "establish new regulatory frameworks" knowing that
those frameworks can be revised by the executive branch."6
Yet Barron and Rakoff s account focuses almost entirely on Congress.
Although Barron and Rakoff make a compelling case that forbearance authority
is a useful tool for Congress, their analysis, as a normative defense of
forbearance, tells only part of the story.6 6 That is because they do not focus on
the functions that forbearance might serve in the hands of the agency itself.
62. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 58, at 2154 (assuming a model of delegation in which "Congress
hands over authority to agencies to determine the details of policy"); Richard B. Stewart,
The Reformation ofAmerican Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1669, 1695 (1975) (stating
that "[i]n many government endeavors it may be impossible in the nature of the subject
matter to specify with particularity the course to be followed," and that in those situations
agencies will frequently be called upon as the primary regulators).
63. See Barron & Rakoff, supra note S.
64. See id. at 293 (identifying "five features that might create conditions especially favorable to
the development of big waiver").
65. Id. at 31o.
66. As the authors themselves state, the "historical forces" they say facilitate the rise of
forbearance-like delegations do not necessarily "provide a normative justification," and may




Understanding those functions is useful for at least two reasons. First, as
the above analysis suggests, without understanding the functions a statutory
forbearance authority might serve, it is harder to know whether such
delegations capture the benefits of agencies' greater expertise and information
relative to Congress, or whether Congress could perform a similar role just as
effectively. And if Congress could perform those roles as well or better than an
agency, thereby depriving such delegations of a public-interested purpose, we
should be more worried that Congress is engaged in pure buck-passing.
Second, an examination of the functions forbearance serves in the hands of the
agency can reveal the potentially counterintuitive roles that forbearance may
serve as part of an overall regulatory system, thus providing further
information for policymakers to consider when deciding whether to include
forbearance-like provisions in statutes of various kinds. Moreover, as argued
below, forbearance may be able to substitute for other, more problematic forms
of agency action, thus buttressing the normative case for forbearance-like
delegations.
The analysis also responds in part to broad constitutional critiques recently
leveled against administrative forbearance authority.6 ' Negative delegations
involve Congress using its legislative power to specify the means by which real
governance concerns are addressed- namely, through the exercise of agency
discretion. Negative delegations, like their positive cousins, thus implement
choices made by the statutes that Congress has passed through the
constitutionally prescribed Article I, Section 7 process. Moreover, the history of
agencies' use of forbearance authority shows that agencies exercising such
authority are not ordinarily "undermining" whatever bargain the statute
represents. Instead, agencies are implementing the statute as a whole, which
includes the negative delegation itself. And because the statute as a whole has
satisfied bicameralism and presentment, the minority-protective functions of
those procedures should be satisfied.
and Rakoff argue that forbearance may enable an "effective, engaged, and democratically
responsive administrative state," a result they favor. Id. at 310.
67. Infra Section III.C directly addresses several more specific critiques.
68. Cf Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1721, 1751 (2002) (arguing, in the context of positive delegations, that all of the
constitutional values served by Article I, Section 7 "are formally protected because the
delegatory statute itself must go through bicameralism and presentment" (emphasis
omitted)). In addition, as a purely formal matter, negative delegations do not violate Article
I, Section 7 because, as Saikrishna Prakash has observed in the context of the Line Item Veto
Act, "The Clause speaks to what Congress must do, not what lawmaking authority
Congress may cede to the Executive Branch" and that "laws may be canceled outside of
bicameralism and presentment because the cancellation delegation is itself an element of the
law -a law that came about through bicameralism and presentment." Saikrishna Bangalore
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II. THE USES OF FORBEARANCE
This Part describes how agencies have used forbearance authority in
practice, creating a taxonomy of the various functions that such authority
performs. As will become apparent, forbearance comes in many shapes and
sizes and has rarely involved nullifying a requirement altogether. For example,
agencies have used forbearance to exempt certain categories of regulated
entities from a requirement's scope, to subject entities to regulation under a
statute while relieving them of the obligation to follow certain requirements, or
to defer a decision on classifying entities one way or another while forbearing
from any obligations that might apply in the interim.
Because the following Sections frequently draw on the FCC's experience, a
brief introduction to the statutory source of the FCC's power will be useful.
The FCC has two different sources of forbearance authority. The first. is §
332(c) of the Communications Act, which was added in 1993.69 That section
subjects commercial mobile services-i.e., cellular telephony-to common
carrier status, which automatically imposes a host of statutory obligations on
mobile carriers.' But § 332 also allows the Commission to render most of those
obligations "inapplicable" to mobile carriers "by regulation."' Second, a more
expansive grant of forbearance authority, added as part of the 1996 overhaul of
the communications laws, is contained in § 16o. ' That section provides that if
certain conditions are met, the Commission "shall forbear" from applying any
requirements contained either in its regulations or in the Communications Act
to "a telecommunications carrier or telecommunications service, or class of
telecommunications carriers or telecommunications services, in any or some of
its or their geographic markets." ' Although both sources of the Commission's
Prakash, Deviant Executive Lawmaking, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1, 35-36 (1998). Kitchen, who
argues that forbearance-like delegations violate bicameralism and presentment
requirements, himself seems to recognize this point, and thus frames his argument against
forbearance largely in terms of the "values" associated with bicameralism and presentment
and not in terms of the constitutional text itself. See Kitchen, supra note 4, at 589-92; see also
infra Section III.C (responding in greater depth to some of Kitchen's arguments).
69. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 6002(b)(2) (A), 107 Stat.
312, 393 (codified at 47 U.S.C. 5 332(c) (2012)).
70. 4 7 U.S.C. § 332(C)(1)(A).
71. Id.
72. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 401, 11o Stat. 56, 128 (codified at
4 7 U.S.C. 5 160(a)).
73. 4 7 U.S.C. 5 160(a). Those conditions are that:
(i) enforcement of such regulation or provision is not necessary to ensure that the




forbearance authority require it to make certain fact-sounding determinations,
they are worded broadly enough that the Commission has substantial
policymaking discretion to determine whether forbearance is justified.'
The following Sections explain several problems forbearance authority
could be used to address and then draw on examples to show how forbearance
authority has served various purposes in the hands of agencies.
A. Addressing Changed Circumstances
Perhaps the most obvious use of a statutory forbearance authority is in
implementing statutory provisions that have become obsolete or
counterproductive due to changed circumstances. 7 Two kinds of changes are
particularly relevant here. First, the factual conditions that justified a statutory
provision might change. 6" The FCC's decades-long efforts to alter the
Communications Act's requirements in the face of newly emerging
competition- culminating in the Commission's defeat in MCI
Telecommunications Corp. v. AT&T"-is what initially prompted Congress to
enact the 1996 Telecommunications Act's forbearance provision.8 Indeed, the
telecommunications carrier or telecommunications service are just and reasonable
and are not unjustly or unreasonably discriminatory;
(2) enforcement of such regulation or provision is not necessary for the protection
of consumers; and
(3) forbearance from applying such provision or regulation is consistent with the
public interest.
Id. § 16o(a)()-(3).
74. See, e.g., EarthLink, Inc. v. FCC, 462 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2oo6) (holding that "no particular
mode of market analysis" is required of the Commission in making its forbearance
determinations). Carriers may petition the FCC to exercise its forbearance authority, and the
Commission has one year-with the possibility of a ninety-day extension-to reach a
decision on such a forbearance petition. 47 U.S.C. § 160(c).
75. On changed circumstances generally, see, for example, GUIDO CALABRESI, A CommON LAW
FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982), which argues that the increasing "statutorification" of
American law has resulted in a profusion of legal requirements that are out of step with
current society. See also Freeman & Spence, supra note 7, at 2-3 (discussing how agencies
respond to Congress's failure to update old statutes).
76. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405,
493 (1989) ("When circumstances change, statutory interpretation becomes especially
difficult. Older statutes may depend on factual assumptions that no longer hold .....
77. 512 U.S. 218 (1994)-
78. In particular, the 1970s saw new forms of long-distance communications technology, such
as MCI's microwave-relay system, which undermined both the belief that long-distance
telephone markets would remain dominated by a single firm and also the policies based on
that belief, such as mandatory tariffing of long-distance services. See JONATHAN E.
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legislative history of the 1996 amendments suggests that Congress acted
specifically in order to overturn the decision in MCI,79 which held that the
FCC's authority to "modify" the Act's tariffing requirements did not create a
forbearance-like power to dispense with those requirements completely.so
Second, our assumptions about facts might change even when the facts on
the ground do not. In other words, what we know or understand about facts
might change even while the actual facts remain exactly the same. A vivid
illustration is provided by the "famous" Delaney Clause,1 which banned food
additives containing carcinogens at a time, the 1950s, "when carcinogenic
substances were difficult to detect and all detectable carcinogens were
extremely dangerous.",8' As time went on, however, our knowledge of
carcinogens changed, and it became clear that a literal application of the
Delaney Clause required the FDA to ban substances that posed only a
minuscule risk of cancer and that may even have been safer than the available
8,
alternatives.
How have agencies used forbearance to deal with such issues? To return
to the main case study, the FCC has used its forbearance authority to
relieve regulated entities of obligations in circumstances where the facts that
NUECHTERLEIN & PHILIP J. WEISER, DIGITAL CROSSROADS: TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND
PoLICY IN THE INTERNET AGE 44-46 (2d ed. 2013) (chronicling MCI's rise as a competitor to
AT&T). See generally Policy & Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Carrier Servs. &
Facilities Authorizations Therefor, 99 F.C.C.2d 1oo, 1022 (1985) (canceling all forborne
carrier tariffs due to an increase in competition), vacated, MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC,
765 F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Scott M. Schoenwald, Regulating Competition in the
Interexchange Telecommunications Market: The Dominant/Nondominant Carrier Approach and
the Evolution of Forbearance, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 367 (1997) (tracing the history of
forbearance prior to the 1996 Telecommunications Act).
7g. See S. REP. No. 103-367, at 117 (1994) (noting that the "[p]rovisions of S. 1822 seek directly
to reverse" the Supreme Court's decision in MCI); 141 CONG. REC. 15,016, 15,106 (1995)
(statement of Sen. Pressler) ("The Federal courts have ruled that the FCC cannot
deregulate. This bill solves that problem and makes deregulation legal and desirable."); see
also Schoenwald, supra note 78, at 449-52 (describing Congress's "resolution of the
forbearance issue").
so. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 512 U.S. at 234.
81. JERRY L. MASHAW ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLic LAw SYSTEM CASES
& MATERIALS 137 (7th ed. 2014).
8z. Sunstein, supra note 76, at 423.
83. See id. at 496-97. For years the FDA attempted to evade literal application of the Clause, but,
in Public Citizen v. Young, the D.C. Circuit concluded that the Clause allowed for no de
minimis exceptions. Public Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 11o8 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see also Richard
A. Merrill, FDA's Implementation of the Delaney Clause: Repudiation of Congressional Choice or
Reasoned Adaptation to Scientific Progress?, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (1988) (discussing the history
of the FDA's regulatory efforts with respect to the Delaney Clause); Sunstein, supra note 76,




once supported the imposition of those obligations have changed. One example
comes from the 1996 Telecommunications Act's "local competition"
provisions, which were designed to spur competition in local (as distinct
from long-distance) telephone markets that had long been dominated by
monopolist firms.8s Among the Act's reforms, Congress controversially
required incumbent carriers to lease portions of their network to competitors at
cost-based rates.
By the mid-2000s, however, the Commission had already seen fit to
exercise its forbearance authority to relieve incumbent carriers of their forced-
leasing obligations in two geographic markets where competition had
developed with unexpected rapidity.8 , What had changed? The answer was
something that Congress could barely have anticipated in 1996: the use of
cable television facilities to provide point-to-point telephony services via Voice-
over-Internet-Protocol (VoIP) technology.88 The entry into local telephone
markets by facilities-based competitors unsettled a regulatory paradigm that
assumed that, absent forced leasing, entry by new market players would be
84. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 251-253 (2012).
8s. See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 371-72 (1999); NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER,
supra note 78, at 51-52.
86. 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3). See generally NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 78, at 58-66
(describing the unbundling obligation imposed by the 1996 Act and the FCC's efforts to
implement it). That the forced leasing requirement (known as network "unbundling")
proved controversial is unsurprising. See Howard A. Shelanski, A Comment on Competition
and Controversy in Local Telecommunications, 5o HASTINGS L.J. 1617, 1621 (1999) ("It is one
thing to tell incumbent firms that competitors will be allowed into their markets; it is
another issue altogether to tell them that they must cooperate, against their interests and for
little if any profit, with those very competitors."). The controversy was heightened by the
FCC's decision to adopt a forward-looking pricing methodology that many incumbent
carriers felt resulted in unfairly low leasing rates. See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note
78, at 60 (describing the FCC's "total element long-run incremental cost" pricing
methodology). Controversy over whether certain network elements were subject to
unbundling and at what rates generated nearly a decade of litigation. See, e.g., Verizon
Commc'ns, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 523 (2002) (upholding the FCC's pricing
methodology); Covad Commc'ns Co. v. FCC, 45o F.3d 528, 531 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (upholding
the Commission's fourth attempt to describe which elements of the incumbent's network
were subject to unbundling).
87. See infra notes 92-93 and accompanying text (citing orders).
88. See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 78, at 192. See generally Blaine Bassett, The
Inevitable Television Revolution: The Technology Is Ready, the Business Is Lagging, and the Law
Can Help, 29 SYRACUSE J. Sci. & TECH. L. 1, 8-9 (2013) (describing the rise of cable
television); Kevin Werbach, No Dialtone: The End of the Public Switched Telephone Network,
66 FED. Comm. L.J. 203 (2014) (discussing the ongoing transition from legacy telephone
services to VolP alternatives).
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very unlikely. 89 If that premise does not hold, forced leasing imposes costs
related both to implementation and market incentives that likely would not be
offset by corresponding benefits.9 o Seizing on these facts, in 2004 Qwest (a
former Bell company) formally asked the FCC to exercise its forbearance
authority and, among other things, relieve Qwest of its unbundling obligations
in Omaha, Nebraska.9 The FCC agreed. 92 As the Commission explained:
While the costs of such regulatory intervention may be warranted in
order to foster competitive entry into the local exchange and exchange
access markets where such competition would not otherwise be
generated, we find that these costs are unwarranted and do not serve
the public interest once local exchange and exchange access markets are
sufficiently competitive . . . . In addition to furthering the congressional
goal of creating competitive local exchange markets, our decision today
also furthers another of Congress's primary aims in the 1996 Act- to
deregulate telecommunications markets to the extent possible. We act
today in accord with Congress's clear intent in section to to sunset in a
narrowly tailored fashion any regulatory requirements that are no
longer necessary in the public interest so long as consumer interests and
competition are protected.93
8. See NUECHTERLEIN &WEISER, supra note 78, at 58-59.
go. See Howard A. Shelanski, Adjusting Regulation to Competition: Toward a New Model for U.S.
Telecommunications Policy, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 55, 69 (2007); see also U.S. Telecom Ass'n v.
FCC, 290 F-3d 415, 427 (D.C. Cit. 2002) ("Each unbundling of an element imposes costs of
its own, spreading the disincentive to invest in innovation and creating complex issues of
managing shared facilities."); Henry E. Smith, Governing the Tele-Semicommons, 22 YALE J.
ON REG. 289 (2005) (discussing governance issues related to forced network sharing).
gi. See Memorandum Op. & Order, Petition of Qwest Corp. for Forbearance Pursuant to 47
U.S.C. 5 160(c) in the Omaha Metro. Statistical Area, 20 FCC Rcd. 19415, 19416 (2005).
Recall that the forbearance provision allows forbearance "in any or some . . . geographic
markets." 47 U.S.C. S 16o(a).
92. Memorandum, 20 FCC Rcd. at 19471.
93. Id. at 19454. In 2007, the Commission again granted unbundling relief to the local telephone
company in Anchorage, Alaska using similar reasoning. See Petition of ACS of Anchorage,
Inc. Pursuant to Section to of the Commc'ns Act of 1934, as Amended, for Forbearance from
Sections 251(c)(3) & 25 2(d)(1) in the Anchorage Study Area, 22 FCC Rcd. 1958 (2007). The
FCC has considered, but has ultimately rejected, several subsequent petitions seeking relief
from unbundling requirements. See Petition of Qwest Corp. for Forbearance Pursuant to 47
U.S.C. § 160(c) in the Phx., Ariz. Metro. Statistical Area, 25 FCC Rcd. 8622 (2010);
Petitions of Qwest Corp. for Forbearance Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 5 160(c) in the Denver,
Minneapolis-St. Paul, Phx., & Seattle Metro. Statistical Areas, 13 FCC Rcd. 11729 (2008);
Petitions of the Verizon Tel. Cos. for Forbearance Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 5 16o(c) in the




Another agency that has used a forbearance-like authority in order to
address changed circumstances is the SEC. Under the statutes it administers,
the SEC has several sources of what the securities laws refer to as "exemptive"
authority- essentially, a forbearance power to relieve parties of statutory
requirements similar to that held by the FCC." In 2005, the SEC exercised that
authority to significantly alter many restrictions on how companies may offer
securities stemming from the 1933 Act, essentially "forbearing" from those
restrictions. 9s As part of the reforms, the Commission relieved "well-known
seasoned issuers"9' from compliance with the anti-gun jumping prohibition
contained in section 5(c) of the Act, which makes it unlawful to communicate
regarding any security offering prior to filing a registration statement
(including a prospectus) with the SEC.97 As the Commission explained, that
statutory provision was "enacted at a time when the means of communications
were limited and restricting communications (without regard to accuracy) to
the statutory prospectus appropriately balanced available communications and
investor protection."98 However, with the advent of modern communications
technology and changes in investor behavior, the pendulum had swung. The
Commission believed that "the gun-jumping provisions of the Securities Act,"
as applied to seasoned issuers, had "impose[d] substantial and increasingly
unworkable restrictions on many communications that would be beneficial to
investors and markets and would be consistent with investor protection."99
The Commission thus removed the restriction for well-seasoned issuers.
21293 (2007). See generally John Meisel, The Evolution ofFederal Communications Commission
Forbearance Orders: From Omaha to Phoenix, 20 CommLAw CONSPECTUS 323 (2012)
(chronicling the shift in the FCC's approach to exercising forbearance in the unbundling
context).
94. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77z-3 (2012) (allowing the SEC to "by rule or regulation . . .
conditionally or unconditionally exempt any person, security, or transaction, or any class or
classes of persons, securities, or transactions, from any provision or provisions of this
subchapter. . . ."); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78mm (providing the SEC with similar authority); 17
C.F.R. § 240 (2015) (collecting sources of exemptive authority).
95. See Securities Offering Reform, Securities Act Release No. 33-8591, 70 Fed. Reg. 44722 (Aug.
3,2005).
g6. See id. at 44726-27 (defining the category of "well-known seasoned issuers").
g7. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c).
gs. Securities Offering Reform, 70 Fed. Reg. at 44731.
99. Id.
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B. Statutory Fit
The problem of changed circumstances emerges when portions of a statute
become unnecessary or counterproductive over time. Some statutes, however,
are born ill fitted. Most relevant here, a statute may be overinclusive -that is, its
"language, read without sufficient regard to context or its intended field of
application, will reach situations that it could not reasonably cover.""oo For
example, a statutory prohibition might on its face prohibit certain conduct that
the reasons for the prohibition do not seem to reach. (Think, for example, of
H.L.A. Hart's famous "vehicles in the park" hypothetical.)' Likewise, a
statutory requirement may obligate regulated entities to do something that
appears unjustified in light of the reasons for the requirement.
A traditional way to deal with overinclusiveness is through purposive
statutory interpretation, wherein the purposes of a statute are invoked in order
to justify creating carveouts from the statutory text."o2 But purposivism cannot
cure all overinclusiveness, especially in an age where textualism enjoys
substantial support. 3 Forbearance authority in the hands of an agency, on the
other hand, can help cure overinclusiveness by allowing an agency to tailor the
statute to the surrounding circumstances. This would ultimately create a
regulatory regime that makes more sense than the "provisional" statute enacted
by Congress.
The FCC has performed such a tailoring function in the mobile wireless
context. Prior to 1993, the Commission regulated mobile-wireless providers -
then emerging on a widespread basis -under an ad hoc regulatory regime that
relied on a hodgepodge of statutory sources of authority. 0 4 In its 1993
oo. Sunstein, supra note 76, at 420.
101. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 121-32 (1961).
102. Such purposive interpretation might be performed by a court or by an agency using its
Chevron powers. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
io. See Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Statutes in Common Law Courts, 91 TEx. L. REV. 479, 486 (2013)
(arguing that, in a recent case, "when faced with the choice between semantic meaning and
statutory purpose ... the Court chose semantic meaning unanimously"); see also Robinson
v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 34o (1997) ("Our first step in interpreting a statute is to
determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard
to the particular dispute in the case. Our inquiry must cease if the statutory language is
unambiguous and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent.").
104. See NUECHTERLEIN &WEISER, supra note 78, at 137; see also Implementation of Sections 3(n)
and 332 of the Commc'ns Act: Regulatory Treatment of Mobile Servs., 9 FCC Rcd. 1411,
1414-17 (1994) (describing the history of FCC regulation in this area). There were




amendments to the Communications Act, Congress brought mobile-wireless
providers within the Act's scope by subjecting "commercial mobile radio
services" - the kind of mass-market voice services now provided by carriers like
AT&T and Verizon-to common-carrier status.1o' As an immediate result of
that decision, many of the various "Title II" common-carriage obligations,
ranging from tariffing requirements to licensing rules obligating providers to
gain permission from the FCC before entering or exiting the market, were to
apply to mobile-wireless providers."o' At the same time, however, Congress
understood that mobile-telephone markets exhibited much greater levels of
competition than traditional wired telephony. So Congress allowed the
Commission to "specify by regulation" that some statutory obligations would
be "inapplicable" to mobile carriers, provided that the Commission had first
determined that such regulations were in the public interest.o
The Commission accordingly responded by forbearing from applying
many of Title II's provisions, including all statutory requirements dealing with
tariffing and entry and exit from the market, to mobile carriers.08 Regarding
the entry and exit certifications required by section 214 of the Communications
Act, the Commission stated:
[Iln a competitive market, application of Section 214 could harm firms
lacking market power since certification procedures can actually deter
entry of innovative and useful services, or can be used by competitors to
delay or block the introduction of such innovations. The presence
of Section 214 barriers to exit may also deter potential entrants
from entering the marketplace . . . . [T]he time involved in the
decertification process can impose additional losses on a carrier
after competitive circumstances have made a particular service
uneconomic and, if adequate substitute services are abundantly
Amendments to Section 332-Mobile Radio, in THE COMMUNICATIONS AcT: A LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE MAJOR AMENDMENTS, 1934-1996, at lo6 (Max D. Paglin ed., 1999).
105. 47 U.S.C. § 332(C)(1) (A) (2012).
io6. See, e.g., id. §§ 203, 214 (applying such obligations to common carriers).
107. Id. As the Conference Report accompanying the 1993 amendments stated, Congress
"intend[ed] to give the Commission the flexibility to determine whether or not the
enforcement of these provisions [was] necessary, in light of their significance to
consumers." H.R. REP. No. 103-213, at 491 (1993) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1993
U.S.C.C.A.N. io88, u18o. The Commission was barred, however, from making obligations
located in sections 201 and 202 of the Act inapplicable to mobile carriers. 47 U.S.C.
S 332(c)(1)(A); see also Berresford, supra note 104, at 107 ("Commercial mobile services,
from their inception, had exhibited a degree of rivalry that was sadly absent from the [Plain
Old Telephone Service] part of the commercial telecommunications business.").
ios. See Implementation, 9 FCC Rcd. at 1418-19.
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available, the discontinuance application is unnecessary to protect
consumers.109
Other agencies have also used forbearance authority to perform a tailoring
role. One example stems from Congress's 1990 amendments to the Clean Air
Act. Section 112 of the 1970 amendments required the EPA to create emission
standards governing hazardous air pollutants from stationary sources; the
standards had to "provide[] an ample margin of safety to protect the public
health.""o The EPA was also tasked with creating a list of hazardous air
pollutants from stationary sources within ninety days of the passage of the
197o amendments."' Between 1970 and 1990, however, the EPA had regulated
only seven air toxins (out of potentially hundreds) under section 112. ' As the
Senate report accompanying the amendments noted, "[T]he law ha[d] worked
poorly."" 3
The 1990 amendments took the task of designating hazardous air
pollutants out of the EPA's hands by specifying an "initial list" of nearly two
hundred such pollutants." At the same time, however, Congress recognized
that its list may have been overinclusive- that is, certain chemical substances
included on the initial list actually may not have posed a threat to public health.
Congress thus empowered the EPA to "delete" any substance from the list of
pollutants upon a showing that the substance "may not reasonably be
anticipated to cause any adverse effects to the human health or adverse
environmental effects. "ns "[A]ny person" may petition the EPA to delete (or
add) a substance to the list, and the EPA is required to "either grant or deny the
petition by publishing a written explanation" of the reasons for its decision
within eighteen months.n,6 The EPA has occasionally exercised its authority to
delete substances from the list."' When it does so, such substances are no
longer regulated under section 112.
iog. Id. at 1481.
io. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, sec. 4(a), 5 112(b)(1)(B), 84 Stat. 1676,
1685.
iM. § 112(b)(1)(A), 84 Stat. at 1685.
ia. See Bradford C. Mank, A Scrivener's Error or Greater Protection of the Public: Does the EPA
Have the Authority To Delist "Low-Risk" Sources of Carcinogens from Section 112's Maximum
Achievable Control Technology Requirements?, 24 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 75, 86-87 (2005).
113. S. REP. No. 101-228, at 128 (1989), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 3513-
114. 42 U.S.C. 5 74 12(b)(1) (2012).
'1S. Id. 5 7 4 12(b)(3)(C). The EPA was also given authority to add substances to the list. Id.
§ 7 4 12(b) (3) (B).
116. Id. § 7 4 12(b)(3)(A).





In each of the examples described above, an agency deregulates in some
way: Congress set a proregulatory baseline that the Executive can then (to a
greater or lesser extent) dismantle. That is not surprising, of course, because
forbearance usually empowers agencies to eliminate or limit the scope of a
statutory requirement.
In a somewhat paradoxical way, however, forbearance authority may also
be used to enable regulation. Imagine the following scenario: an agency is
tasked with deciding whether something or someone falls within the meaning
of a statutory term. The statute is ambiguous in the Chevron sense, meaning
that the agency therefore has policymaking discretion (within bounds) to
decide the classification question either way."' In many settings, the decision,
if made in the affirmative, will automatically trigger a number of statutory
requirements (let's call them Requirements A, B, and C)."' Assume that the
social benefits of applying Requirement A to the entity in question are net
positive-yielding, say, one billion dollars in net present value. But if the net
costs of applying Requirements B and C are sufficiently high, they may swamp
those benefits. The rub is this: in most situations, the agency's choice is all-or-
nothing -that is, the agency can decide the initial classification one way or
another, but once it does, it cannot pick and choose among the regulatory
consequences of that decision. Thus, a rational agency faced with a situation in
which Requirement A is socially beneficial but the costs of Requirements B and
C outweigh those benefits will choose not to regulate at all.
Statutory forbearance authority may solve this dilemma. An agency armed
with such authority can simultaneously make the classification decision in
question-essentially flipping the "on" switch-while at the same time
avoiding the undesirable regulatory consequences of doing so. For example,
the agency in the above hypothetical could choose to apply A while at the same
time negating B and C.
This is essentially what the FCC has done in the continuing controversy
over so-called "net-neutrality" rules. 2 o Proponents of net neutrality seek to
118. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984).
iig. For a real-world example of such a scenario, consider the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act, which grants the FDA authority to regulate "drugs." 21 U.S.C. § 321(g) (2012). The
agency receives Chevron deference concerning whether substances qualify as drugs under the
statutory definition. An FDA determination that a substance qualifies as a drug triggers
various statutory requirements, including possible removal from the market. See FDA v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 126, 132, 134-35 (2000).
no. See supra note 1 and accompanying text; see also Rebecca R. Ruiz, F.C.C. Sets Net Neutrality
Rules, N.Y. TimEs (Mar. 12, 2015), http://www.nytimes.coV2o1s/o3/i3/technology/fcc
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regulate the relationship between ISPs, like Comcast, and Internet content
providers, such as Google or Netflix."' By reclassifying broadband ISPs as
Title II "telecommunications carriers," the Commission placed net neutrality
on sounder legal footing.'" But the decision to reclassify broadband ISPs also
automatically subjected those providers to the full suite of "common-carrier"
obligations contained in Title II of the Communications Act, including retail
rate tariffing requirements.' Many believe that a number of the common
carrier obligations, such as tariffing requirements, should not apply to ISPs."
Thus, proposals to reclassify broadband ISPs as common carriers have almost
uniformly demanded forbearance from certain Title II rules, and in particular
ex ante rate regulation, as a key component. 2 s And a large part of the
Commission's February 2015 Title II reclassification order was devoted to
-releases-net-neutrality-rules.html [http://perma.cc/76KC-3W9T] (discussing potential
legal challenges to the FCC's decision).
121. The core of most net-neutrality proposals is a ban on "priority-tiering" or paid prioritization
agreements, which are "contractual deals between broadband networks and Internet content
providers for favored treatment over [the ISP's] platform." NUECHTERLEIN &WEISER, supra
note 78, at 198, 205. Net-neutrality proponents fear that without such a prohibition, ISPs
may privilege certain content providers and disfavor others. See, e.g., BARBARA VAN
SCHEWICK, INTERNET ARCHITECTURE AND INNOVATION 218-19 (2010); Barbara van
Schewick, Towards an Economic Framework for Network Neutrality Regulation, 5 J. ON
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 329, 332 (2007); Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband
Discrimination, 2 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 141, 141-42 (2003).
122. The FCC's prior attempts to enforce net-neutrality obligations had failed in the courts. See
Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (striking down the FCC's attempt to impose
net-neutrality rules under section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996); Comcast
Corp. v. FCC, 6oo F.3 d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (invalidating the FCC's attempt to regulate net
neutrality under its "ancillary" authority). The FCC's Title II reclassification order is
currently on appeal. See Brett Kendall, Appeals Court To Hear Arguments Over FCC's Net-
Neutrality Rules, WAIL ST. J. (Aug. 3, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/appeals-court-to
-hear-arguments-over-fccs-net-neutrality-rules-1438640757 [http://perma.cc/2MJ5-R6XBJ.
123. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 201(a), 203 (2012).
124. For example, Howard Shelanski, currently the head of OMB's Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), has observed that retail-price regulation is used only in
relatively rare situations, such as when a monopolist is unlikely to face competition because
of significant barriers to market entry. See Howard A. Shelanski, Adjusting Regulation to
Competition: Toward a New Model for U.S. Telecommunications Policy, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 55,
64-65 (2007). Outside such situations, the costs associated with ex ante price regulation
normally outweigh any benefits. See id. at 84-99.
125. See, e.g., Austin Schlick, A Third-Way Legal Framework for Addressing the Comcast Dilemma,
FED. COMM. COMMISSION 8 (May 6, 20o), https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch
/DOC-297945A1.pdf [https://perma.cc/84NE-JKEK]; see also NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER,




forbearing from such obligations.' As the Commission explained, the order
forbore "from 30 statutory provisions and render[ed] over 700 codified rules
inapplicable" in order "to establish a light-touch regulatory framework tailored
to preserving those provisions that advance our goals of more, better, and open
broadband.""
D. Reducing Uncertainty
Another use for a negative-lawmaking delegation in the hands of an agency
is to reduce regulatory uncertainty while the agency makes (or defers) a
decision on an issue with broad consequences. Recent scholarship has
highlighted how agencies often wait to make decisions with important
regulatory consequences. For example, prior to Massachusetts v. EPA,'"9 the
EPA had studiously avoided deciding whether greenhouse gases were air
pollutants requiring regulation under the Clean Air Act. 30
One obvious cost arising from agency decisions not to decide, however, is
regulatory uncertainty. Take the hypothetical described above, in which an
agency is tasked with deciding whether something or someone meets a
statutory definition, with an affirmative answer triggering three distinct
regulatory requirements (A, B, and C). Now imagine that the agency declares
that, at least for the time being, it is agnostic on the classification question-
that is, it has chosen not to decide. The costs of choosing not to decide may not
be great as long as the agency is the only relevant enforcer and it is clear that
the agency will not enforce requirements A, B, and C until it has decided the
underlying question. However, that often will not be the case. Frequently,
whether regulatory requirements A, B, or C apply will be determined in the
course of a legal dispute between private parties. And in those situations,
courts -including district courts-may ultimately have to decide the
classification question itself, subject to possible later override by the agency.13'
n6. See Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 8o Fed. Reg. 19738, 19809-32 (Apr. 13,
2015) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pts. 1, 8, 20).
127. Id. at 19743-44.
us. See Sharon B. Jacobs, The Administrative State's Passive Virtues, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 565
(2014); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The Law of "Not Now": When Agencies Defer
Decisions, 103 GEO. L.J. 157 (1014).
129. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
13o. See Jacobs, supra note 128, at 575-76.
131. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005)
("A court's prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency construction otherwise
entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds that its construction
1579
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Not only can this dynamic cause significant ex ante regulatory uncertainty, but
it also may undermine one of the oft-cited rationales for the Chevron doctrine-
namely, the value of uniformity in federal law.'
Now imagine that the agency could exercise forbearance authority and
specify that certain requirements do not apply while also deferring decision on
the underlying classification question. In other words, the agency in the above
hypothetical could declare that Requirements A, B, and C (or just A, or B and
C, etc.) lack legal force and effect while remaining mum on the broader
classification issue. In this way, the agency could defer a large decision and
engage in "administrative minimalism" while still maintaining national
uniformity and reducing uncertainty, at least with respect to the application of
requirements A, B, and C.'
The FCC has just this power under its forbearance authority, although that
power had to be thrust upon the agency by litigants and the D.C. Circuit. The
FCC had for years avoided deciding whether certain Internet Protocol-based
services, including VoIP services providing two-way voice communication, are
"telecommunications services" under the Communications Act; this
determination carries with it an array of important regulatory consequences,
including various common-carrier obligations under Title II of the
Communications Act.' 1
It was in this context that in 2004, SBC Communications (now AT&T)
petitioned the Commission to forbear from placing Title II requirements on
"IP platform services" - including VoIP - "to the extent that such regulation
might otherwise be found to apply.""'s The Commission rejected the petition
on the procedural ground that the FCC's forbearance authority did not allow it
to forbear from obligations that could only hypothetically apply in the
future.' 6 in other words, because it had yet to decide the initial question
follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency
discretion.").
132. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifiy Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme
Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review ofAgency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1093, 1121-22
(1987).
133. On "administrative minimalism," see Jacobs, supra note 128, at 583-88.
134. See, e.g., Report & Order & Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Rural Call
Completion, 28 FCC Rcd. 16154, 16172 n.ioi (2013) ("The Commission has not determined
whether VoIP services should be classified as 'telecommunications services' or 'information
services' under the Communications Act, and we do not decide that issue here."). See
generally Marc Elzweig, D, None of the Above: On the FCC Approach to VolP Regulation, 20o8
U. CI. LEGAL F. 489 (chronicling the history of the FCC's treatment of VoIP).
13s. Petition of SBC Commc'ns Inc. for Forbearance from the Application of Title II Common
Carrier Regulation to IP Platform Servs., 20 FCC Rcd. 9361, 9362 (2005).




regarding whether IP services were telecommunications services, the
Commission concluded that it could not forbear from specific regulatory
requirements that would flow from an affirmative answer to that initial
question.
The D.C. Circuit disagreed.' It rebutted the Commission's claim that
conditional forbearance was never in the "public interest.",, 8 The court stated
that "[p]arties petitioning for conditional forbearance seek elimination of
regulatory uncertainty, and even the Commission recognizes that 'regulatory
uncertainty ... in itself may discourage investment and innovation' regarding
the very technologies Congress intended the Act to promote."" In essence, the
court determined that forbearance can be used to reduce uncertainty regarding
the specific obligations of regulated parties while the agency decides (or defers)
an issue of broader importance.
III. FORBEARANCE AS DELEGATION
Part II described the functions that a forbearance authority can serve. This
Part asks a different question: is delegation of those functions to an agency
normatively desirable?
Section III.A applies the traditional justifications for delegation to the
special case of negative-lawmaking delegations. Those justifications apply
rather straightforwardly in this different context. In particular, agencies'
greater expertise and flexibility likely make forbearance by agencies superior to
action by Congress through legislative repeals or "sunset" clauses specifying an
expiration date for statutory requirements.40
While Section III.A asks whether agency forbearance is superior to action
by the other branches, Section III.B analyzes whether forbearance authority is
superior to other regulatory tools that agencies possess, such as the power to
selectively enforce statutes. An express forbearance authority may serve as a
substitute for agency nonenforcement in a range of circumstances, and a
variety of process considerations - including concerns about "underground"
policymaking outside the normal accountability channels - make the exercise of
forbearance authority normatively preferable as a policymaking device. Perhaps
ironically, even opponents of delegation may prefer express forbearance
137. AT&T Inc. v. FCC, 452 F.3 d 830 (D.C. Cir. 20o6).
138. Id. at 836.
139. Id. (quoting Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over Cable and Other
Facilities, 17 FCC Rcd. 4798, 4802 (2002) (declaratory ruling and notice of proposed
rulemaking)).
140. See Jacob E. Gersen, Temporary Legislation, 74 U. CHI. L. REv. 247, 259-61 (2007).
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authority to one frequently used alternative - detailed legislation coupled with
de facto delegation to agencies of the power to tailor legislation through
enforcement discretion."
Section III.C addresses a number of objections that may be raised against
agency forbearance authority. One important theme is that the charges leveled
against negative delegations are simply variants on concerns raised with respect
to more traditional positive delegations. These charges do not apply with any
more force to negative delegations; in fact, several of those charges are
considerably weaker with respect to negative delegations. Thus, once again,
even opponents of delegation generally may have reason to tolerate forbearance
authority as an alternative to more open-ended positive delegations.
A. Traditional Justificationsfor Delegation to Agencies
This Section applies the traditional justifications for delegation to agency
forbearance authority. Because of the greater expertise and flexibility of
agencies vis-A-vis Congress, agencies might be better at wielding the power to
deprive statutory provisions of their legal force and effect.
1. Expertise-Information
Perhaps the classic justification for delegation is to harness agencies'
superior expertise and information vis-A-vis Congress."' Agencies are assumed
to know more about the likely effects of a given policy choice than either
Congress or the courts.14 ' Thus, in the traditional positive-delegation model,
141. See generally Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119
YALE L.J. 458 (2009) [hereinafter Cox & Rodriguez, The President and Immigration Law]
(describing how immigration law involves significant de facto delegation of policymaking to
the Executive through enforcement discretion); Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The
President and Immigration Law Redux, 125 YALE L.J. 104 (2015) (noting the continuation of
this trend).
142. See, e.g., Lemos, supra note 58, at 445; Pardo & Watts, supra note 58, at 424 ("One of the
main factors supporting congressional delegations of broad policymaking power to agencies
is that agencies possess specialized expertise."); Spence & Cross, supra note 58, at 135;
Matthew C. Stephenson, Bureaucratic Decision Costs and Endogenous Agency Expertise, 23 J.L.
EcoN. & ORG. 469, 469 (2007) [hereinafter Stephenson, Bureaucratic Decision Costs];
Matthew C. Stephenson, Information Acquisition and Institutional Design, 124 HARv. L. REv.
1422, 1440-41 (2011) [hereinafter Stephenson, Information Acquisition]. See generally Cass R.
Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, ioi HARv. L. REv. 421, 442, 444 (1987)
(discussing the "New Deal belief in the importance of technical expertise" and the
corresponding push toward giving agencies "a large measure of autonomy").




agencies are tasked with a goal and allowed broad latitude to select the policy
means to achieve that goal.
It is not difficult to see how agencies' greater expertise and information
might also justify delegations of the "negative" sort. Take the issue of statutory
obsolescence. When Congress has made some effort to specify the details of a
statute, and even when Congress has made a large one-time investment to
acquire the information necessary to do so, the requirements Congress has
fashioned may become unnecessary or counterproductive over time. Congress
might assume responsibility for determining when statutes become outdated:
it might trust a future Congress to repeal obsolete requirements, or it might
specify ex ante that certain provisions will expire on a certain date. A better
option, however, may be to delegate that obsolescence determination to an
agency. Because agencies often have large staffs of experts devoted to studying
a particular area,' they are more likely to be able to make informed decisions
about when statutory requirements have become obsolete. They likely are also
better at assessing the often complex effects of lifting a statutory
requirement."s
Agencies' expertise and informational advantages also may make them
better at tailoring statutes to cure overinclusiveness. As noted above,
sometimes Congress realizes that its "initial" legislation is likely to require
tailoring, and it delegates that task to an expert agency." 6 Although Congress
may have enough information to write a "first draft" of legislation" and may
prefer for any number of reasons that its draft be the default until the agency
acts, Congress may also reasonably predict that an agency will have greater
expertise regarding how the statute should be narrowed going forward.
With regard to the two other functions of negative delegations, enabling
regulation and reducing uncertainty, it is less clear that Congress is ever in a
144. See Jonathan S. Masur & Jonathan Remy Nash, The Institutional Dynamics of Transition
Relief, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 391, 449 (2010) (noting that agencies "can hire staff with technical
skill and can explore complicated policy issues to a degree impossible in a court or, to a
lesser extent, Congress").
145. Consider, for example, whether the FCC should continue to require long-distance telephone
carriers to file tariffs under the Communications Act. See supra notes 77-80 and
accompanying text. That determination depends on the answers to several complex
questions. How competitive are long-distance markets? Is tariffing impeding further
competition by deterring entry into the market? Does tariffing facilitate leader-follower
pricing in long-distance markets to the detriment of consumers? Will eliminating tariffing
impede the FCC's ability to monitor industry practices and allow carriers to charge
supracompetitive rates? When it comes to answering these questions, the FCC is likely the
government actor with the most expertise.
146. See supra Section II.B (collecting examples of this practice).
147. Barron & Rakoff, supra note 5, at 270.
1583
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
particularly good position to perform these tasks in the first place. These two
functions address situations in which old regulatory structures are applied in
new or unanticipated ways. For example, Congress barely anticipated the rise
of broadband Internet when it wrote the communications laws. As a
consequence, both the definitions and requirements contained in the
Communications Act apply rather crudely to broadband. In theory, Congress
could intervene to create a more rational regulatory structure in such
situations. But as will be discussed below, Congress's crowded docket and
lethargic pace make such an intervention unlikely.'
One might object at this point that the Executive's decision to forbear often
may not be motivated by expert judgment. Rather, we might predict that
political opposition to a given statutory requirement is often what will fuel an
agency's exercise of forbearance authority.
The general point -that agency decision making might be influenced by
political as well as expert judgment -cannot be denied. 9 Denying Congress
the ability to include forbearance provisions in its statutes is unlikely to be the
right response, however, and may actually make the problem worse.so The
problem of politics in agency decision making - to the extent it is a problem - is
one endemic to the administrative state, and not one specific or unique in any
way to agency forbearance authority. Moreover, as argued below, including
forbearance provisions in statutes may actually provide Congress a way to
reduce the amount of slack between the enacting Congress's wishes and the
actions of the agency, at least as compared to traditional delegations.' Finally,
the increased opportunity that expressly delegated forbearance authority
provides for judicial review and for monitoring by Congress- because, for
148. See Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case for Expanding
the Role ofAdministrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REv. 93, 140-41 (2005).
149. The exact role politics should play in agency decision making is contested. See, e.g., Jody
Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT.
REV. 51, 54-64 (describing the "problem of politicized expertise"); Kagan, supra note 42
(generally defending presidential involvement in agency decision making); Kathryn A.
Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2 (2009)
(arguing that "political" considerations should rightfully influence agency decision making
in certain situations).
Iso. Normally, the fact that otherwise expert agencies might sometimes engage in politics is not
a reason to prohibit Congress from delegating authority to them. Rather, the risk that the
Executive's political preferences might diverge from Congress's is simply a factor that
Congress should consider when deciding whether and how broadly to delegate in the first
instance. See Stephenson, Information Acquisition, supra note 142, at i44o (noting that a
principal such as Congress should be "willing to delegate more discretion to an agent with
expected policy preferences similar to the principal's own").




example, it is subject to notice-and-comment requirements - reduces the risk of
unchecked political influence compared to executive branch nonenforcement."s 2
2. Flexibility
Another common justification for delegation to agencies is their superior
flexibility. As Pardo and Watts have noted, "[A] gencies are better able to adapt
rules to respond to new information, different facts, or changed circumstances
than Congress (which is constrained by political roadblocks and institutional
barriers) or the courts (which are constrained by stare decisis)."'I Indeed,
under prevailing administrative-law principles, an agency is provided broad
discretion both to fashion the details of policy and to change or repeal those
details."s4
The flexibility rationale for delegation applies particularly well to negative
delegations. First, the same factors that make agencies more likely to revise
their own regulations in response to new information make them more likely
to be able to revise congressionally specified requirements through forbearance.
One might think Congress should respond vigorously to changed
circumstances, but a number of factors may prevent it from doing so."'
Second, the fact that an agency can reverse or revise its decisions more easily
than Congress means that an agency is more likely to fix an erroneous decision.
This flexibility is particularly valuable when statutory requirements are
eliminated in response to changed circumstances. After all, there may be
uncertainty regarding whether the statute itself is responsible for the changed
circumstances and a risk that the problems addressed by the statute will
reoccur after the statutory requirements in question are rendered inapplicable.
Third, and relatedly, agencies' greater flexibility can allow valuable
experimentation. Recent work has shown that when laws can be more easily
reversed, the optimal approach may be to experiment with policies in order to
152. See infra Section III.B.
153. Pardo & Watts, supra note 58, at 443; see also Lemos, supra note 58, at 453 ("A final argument
in favor of agency lawmaking - and nonenforcement of the nondelegation doctrine - is that
agencies are better able than Congress to adapt rules to respond to new information or
changed circumstances"); Stephenson, supra note 148, at 139 ("Flexibility, like expertise, is
often invoked to justify delegation of substantive policy choices to agencies.").
154. See Pardo & Watts, supra note 58, at 443; see also FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556
U.S. 502, 514-16 (2009) (rejecting heightened judicial review for agency policy reversals);
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 863-64 (1984)
(upholding agencies' power to change interpretations of the statutes they administer).
155. See Stephenson, supra note 148, at 140-41 (explaining why Congress might not act even
when it would be beneficial for it to do so).
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gain valuable information that can help policymakers formulate general
rules.s6 A forbearance authority allows an agency to experiment not with
regulation but with deregulation. Of course, deregulatory experimentation
carries its own risks. Agencies might, for example, experiment in ways that
undo requirements that in fact remain necessary, resulting in backsliding.'s
But while the risks associated with experimentation through forbearance must
be taken seriously, the added flexibility afforded by forbearance nonetheless
makes it a potentially valuable tool in the hands of agencies.
B. Advantages over Policymaking Through Enforcement
Section III.A focused on institutional choice, asking whether agencies,
Congress, or courts were better at updating outdated statutes. This Section
asks a slightly different set of questions. How does an express forbearance
authority compare to other policymaking tools that an agency possesses and
that serve similar ends? And should we prefer agencies exercising power
pursuant to an express forbearance authority to them shaping statutes through
more informal means, especially nonenforcement policies?
Recent scholarship has highlighted the extent to which executive
nonenforcement of federal statutes can substitute for more explicit forms of
policymaking.s8 Take the area of immigration. The immigration laws resemble
the tax code in the number of congressionally specified details they contain.'15 9
156. See Yair Listokin, Learning Through Policy Variation, 118 YALE L.J. 480, 483-84 (20o8); see also
Zachary J. Gubler, Experimental Rules, 55 B.C. L. REV. 129 (2014) (encouraging agencies to
adopt experimental rules); Stephenson, Information Acquisition, supra note 142, at 1429 ("In
some cases, a policymaker might implement a pilot program that, while not itself cost
justified, will generate useful empirical information that can then be used in the formulation
of more general public policy.").
157. Of course, experimentation might have costs of its own, such as regulatory uncertainty
regarding the outcome of the experiment. As with any other kind of action, the agency
should therefore weigh the costs and benefits of experimentation before undertaking it.
158. See Kate Andrias, The President's Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031, 1035 (2013);
Love & Garg, supra note 8, at 1197-99 (providing examples of how the Executive uses
enforcement policies to pursue substantive policy goals); Price, supra note 8, at 674 ("[T]he
practice of executive policymaking through nonenforcement stretches back across recent
administrations."); Daniel T. Deacon, Note, Deregulation Through Nonenforcement, 85
N.Y.U. L. REV. 795 (2010). Several slightly older works pursued similar themes. See, e.g.,
Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An Arbitrariness Approach, 79
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657 (2004); Mary M. Cheh, When Congress Commands a Thing To Be Done:
An Essay on Marbury v. Madison, Executive Inaction, and the Duty of the Courts To Enforce the
Law, 72 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 253 (2003); Ruth Colker, Administrative Prosecutorial
Indiscretion, 63 TUL. L. REV. 877 (1989).




However, as Adam Cox and Cristina Rodriguez have explained, because the
Executive cannot (due to resource constraints) possibly remove all "formally
deportable" noncitizens, the system provides the Executive broad discretion to
shape the law through enforcement policies. 6 o Indeed, Cox and Rodriguez
maintain that this ability to shape immigration policy through enforcement
practices amounts to a "de facto delegation of power" from Congress to decide
which particular persons (or classes of persons) stay in the country and which
do not. 6 ,
This Section examines the process reasons we might prefer agencies to act
pursuant to an express forbearance authority rather than pursuant to
i6,
nonenforcement. One assumption this Section makes is that action pursuant
to an express forbearance authority can reasonably substitute for
nonenforcement practices, such that the delegation of express forbearance
authority to agencies will, at least in some cases, lead to less reliance on
nonenforcement as a policymaking tool. Although agencies debating whether
to act through one or the other means may still have incentives to rely on
nonenforcement, perhaps particularly when they want to shield their actions
from public scrutiny or judicial review, agencies also have strong incentives
pointing in the opposite direction. For one, action taken pursuant to an express
delegation is more durable and more likely to carry over into the next
administration. Thus, agencies looking to "lock in" policies may prefer to act
through delegated rulemaking authority. In addition, as Justice Scalia recently
explained, the power to deprive statutory requirements of their legal force is
stronger than simple nonenforcement because it can stop private parties who
otherwise hold private rights of action, and not just the agency, from enforcing
statutory requirements. *13 The following discussion will therefore assume that
16o. Id.
161. Id. Recent controversies have vividly displayed such power in action. After the DREAM Act,
which would have protected certain younger persons from deportation, failed to pass
Congress in 2010, the Obama Administration implemented several of the Act's key
provisions through nonenforcement policies. See Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 8, at 788-91.
Using nonenforcement to implement substantive policy goals is by no means limited to
immigration law or to Democratic administrations. As one example, President George W.
Bush was accused of implementing deregulatory policies concerning coal-fired power plants
through nonenforcement practices after having those same policies struck down by the
courts when done through rulemaking. See Deacon, supra note 158, at 811-13.
162. Some of these reasons echo the explanations scholars have given for preferring
policymaking through rulemaking instead of adjudication. See, e.g., Kirti Dada & Richard L.
Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REv.
769, 812 (2013) ("Adjudication ... allows agencies to conduct policymaking in a less visible
form than rulemaking.").
163. See Util. Air Regulatory Grp. V. EPA (UARG), 13 4 S. Ct. 2427, 2445 (2014).
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agencies sometimes will act, if given the opportunity, through an express
negative delegation when they otherwise would have pursued similar ends
through nonenforcement.
1. The Take Care Clause
One advantage of agency action pursuant to an express forbearance
authority is its greater consonance with the Constitution's Take Care Clause,
which provides that the President "shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed."' 6  Scholars have argued that when the Executive uses its
enforcement discretion in a manner that is too categorical or policy-based, it
violates the Take Care Clause.6 s On this view, while the Executive has broad
discretion to decide whether to enforce statutory requirements in individual
cases, decisions not to enforce a statute prospectively for entire categories of
violations go too far, effectively amending the laws that Congress has passed.
Whatever one thinks of these claims, the important point is that an express
congressional delegation of authority to deprive statutory requirements of legal
force and effect for certain categories of cases solves any dilemma posed by the
text of the Take Care Clause. 66 That is because the negative delegation is
endogenous to the statute itself. Executive action pursuant to such a delegation
therefore is not "unfaithful" to the law Congress has passed.167 Instead, an
agency exercising forbearance authority pursuant to a congressional statute is
faithfully executing that statute as written.
164. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 3.
165. See Price, supra note 8, at 705 ("[C]ategorical nonenforcement for policy reasons usurps
Congress's function of embodying national policy in law; it effectively curtails the statute
that Congress enacted, replacing it with a narrower prohibition."); see also Delahunty & Yoo,
supra note 8, at 856 ("The common idea that the President has a positive constitutional
authority to decide not to enforce the civil law is mistaken.").
166. Of course, such express delegations raise separate questions under other constitutional
doctrines, such as nondelegation and bicameralism and presentment. Those questions, of
course, are what this Article seeks to address.
167. See Price, supra note 8, at 707-08 (arguing that negative delegations "raise[] none of the
[Take Care Clause] concerns that support a presumption against executive suspending or
dispensing authority in the absence of congressional authorization"). Zachary Price also
finds little historical evidence that the original understanding of the U.S. Constitution
precluded such delegations. Id. But see HAMBURGER, supra note 12, at 78 (arguing that the





A second reason that we might prefer agency action pursuant to an express
forbearance authority is that it provides greater opportunities to monitor
agency activity. One persistent criticism of the administrative state, and
particularly of broad delegations, is that policy is frequently formulated
through allegedly less transparent means.,6 Less visible policymaking may
lead to less accountable government. 69 Visibility also may be linked to other
good government values invoked by opponents of delegation, such as the rule
of law." 0
But agencies themselves can act in more or less visible (and thus
accountable) ways. '7 And one function of administrative law is to encourage
agencies to announce policies in ways that the people and their elected
representatives can more easily monitor. 72
Agency action pursuant to an express forbearance authority is much more
likely to be visible. Several of the delegations discussed above specifically
require the agency to invoke forbearance authority by rule or regulation, which
in turn requires the agency to publish its actions in the Federal Register. 3 And
in every one of the above examples of agencies using their forbearance
authority, the agency has done so following a notice-and-comment process.74
168. Or, if you prefer, from the pen of "some green eye-shade type in the bowels of the
bureaucracy." Thomas 0. Sargentich, Normative Tensions in the Theory of Presidential
Oversight ofAgency Rulemaking, 7 ADMIN. L.J. 325, 329 (1993) (quoting Quayle Competitiveness
Council Called Secretive, Meddlesome, by OMB Watch Report, 174 Daily Rep. for Executives
(BNA), at A-11 (Sept. 9, 1991)).
169. See Kagan, supra note 42, at 2332 (calling "the degree to which the public can understand the
sources and levers of bureaucratic action" a "fundamental precondition of accountability in
administration"); Stephenson, supra note 148, at 137 (assuming a correlation between
visibility and accountability).
170. See, e.g., DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: How CONGRESS ABUSES
THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION 19-20 (1993); see also Kagan, supra note 42, at 2368
(arguing that the nondelegation doctrine is used to "promote distinctive rule of law values"
and specifically to "provide notice, prevent arbitrariness, and facilitate judicial review").
171. See, e.g., Deacon, supra note 158, at 816-17.
172. See Kathryn A. Watts, Constraining Certiorari Using Administrative Law Principles, 16o U. PA.
L. REV. 1, 23 (2011) ("[A]dministrative law's primary purpose has been to develop various
legal structures and mechanisms-such as political oversight, judicial review, public
participation, and reason-giving requirements -that help to legitimate and control agency
action.").
173. See supra notes 71, 94 and accompanying text.
174. See supra Part II (discussing examples).
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Such processes are likely mandated by the APA because negative delegations
prospectively alter substantive legal obligations."s
A notice-and-comment process resulting in a formal regulation is, for
obvious reasons, a much more visible form of policymaking than is statutory
nonenforcement. Following the FCC's May 2014 Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking on net neutrality, the agency received almost four million
comments." Although that proceeding is surely something of an outlier, it
shows the potential of notice and comment to bring regulatory issues into the
public discourse." Less dramatically but probably more importantly, notice-
and-comment processes provide information to political insiders, including
elected politicians. Influential work by Mathew McCubbins, Roger Noll, and
Barry Weingast, for example, has argued that such processes contribute to a
"fire alarm" system of oversight in which interested parties can more easily
monitor agency behavior and alert Congress (or the President) to potential
problems."" This contrasts with more costly forms of oversight such as
congressional committee investigations, in which politicians must acquire
information on their own.1 7 9
3. Arbitrariness
Another objection lodged against the modern administrative state is that
agency policymaking encourages "arbitrary" government decision making.so
175. See, e.g., U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 40o F.3 d 29, 34 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (explaining the
circumstances in which agencies must use notice-and-comment rulemaking).
176. Jacob Kastrenakes, FCC Received a Total of 3.7 Million Comments on Net Neutrality, VERGE
(Sept. 16, 2014, 6:o6 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2oi4/9/16/6257887/fcc-net-neutrality
-3-7-million-comments-made [http://perma.cc/B883-HCF9].
177. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Rulemaking and the Administrative Procedure Act, 32 TULSA L.J. 185,
189 (1996) ("[R]ulemaking enhances the political accountability and legitimacy of agency
policy making by providing the general public, the President, and members of Congress
advance notice of an agency's intent to make major policy decisions and an opportunity to
influence the policies ultimately chosen by the agency.").
178. See Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative Procedures as
Instruments ofPolitical Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 274 (1987) [hereinafter McNollGast,
Administrative Procedures]; Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast,
Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control
ofAgencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 434 (1989) [hereinafter McNollGast, Structure and Process].
179. See McNollGast, Structure and Process, supra note 178, at 434-35.
i8o. For the classic treatments of administrative arbitrariness, see KENNETH CuLp DAvis,
DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PREUMINARY INQUIRY (1969); and HENRY J. FRIENDLY, THE





The core of the concern is that delegation allows policy to be formulated
outside the deliberative structures set up by the Constitution. These
deliberative mechanisms were once thought to ensure that the government acts
with public purposes in mind.'"' Administrative arbitrariness, defined by the
government's failure to act rationally and according to public purposes, is thus
one threat traditionally associated with delegation.""
The primary way American law deals with administrative arbitrariness is
through various subconstitutional rules derived from the APA and enforced
through judicial review. Most importantly, agencies proceeding through
notice-and-comment rulemaking generally must (a) provide reasons for
their decisions, including a response to any significant objections;"' and (b)
engage in "reasoned-decisionmaking" such that the policies they adopt are at
least minimally rational.,8' They also must base their decisions on the factors
made relevant by Congress.' These requirements seek to discipline agency
decision making and promote public-regarding (i.e., nonarbitrary) action by
* 86
agencies.
Agency nonenforcement decisions generally are not subject to judicial
review and thus do not have to satisfy the requirements of reason giving and
181. See Bressman, supra note 158, at 1688-89.
182. The potential for administrative arbitrariness was one prominent concern picked up by
Judge Williams's opinion inAmerican Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. EPA, 175 F. 3 d 1027, t038 (D.C.
Cir. 1999), rev'd in part sub nom. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
183. See Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, 116 YALE L.J. 952, 998 (2007)
(arguing that the requirement that an agency give reasons for its decisions "promotes
conditions for rationality, regularity, stability, and principled accountability within the
boundaries of acceptable discretion"); see also United States v. N.S. Food Prods. Corp., 568
F.2d 240, 252 (2d Cir. 1977) ("It is not in keeping with the rational process to leave vital
questions, raised by comments which are of cogent materiality, completely unanswered. The
agencies certainly have a good deal of discretion in expressing the basis of a rule, but the
agencies do not have quite the prerogative of obscurantism reserved to legislatures.").
184. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 461, 528 n.313 (2003) ("The reasoned-decisionmaking
requirement calls on agencies, as a condition of judicial validation of their policy decisions,
to engage in the type of decisionmaking that tends to produce rational decisions."); see also
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Corp., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)
("Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on
factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an
important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to
the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a
difference in view or the product of agency expertise.").
185. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43.
186. See Bressman, supra note 184, at 527-29.
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rationality that apply to other categories of agency action. 8 , In Heckler v.
Chaney, the Supreme Court held that agency nonenforcement decisions are
presumptively unreviewable under the APA.'M That presumption has limits,,8 ,
but those limits are unlikely to play a meaningful role in cabining agency
action.' 90 In addition, even apart from the APA, constitutional standing
requirements often prevent members of the public from challenging agency
nonenforcement decisions.'9 '
By contrast, and as explained above, agency action taken pursuant to a
forbearance authority will result in a "rule" under the APA. Judicial review of
such a rule is presumptively available.' 9 The FCC's forbearance decisions, for
example, have been routinely subject to judicial review under the normal
"arbitrary and capricious" standard.'9
187. See Bressman, supra note 158, at 1691-92 (criticizing agency nonenforcement on these
grounds).
i88. See 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985).
i89. See id. at 833, 838 (explaining circumstances in which the review of nonenforcement
decisions might be possible, including where the decision amounts to "an abdication of [the
agency's] statutory responsibilities").
igo. See Deacon, supra note 158, at 803-04.
191. See, e.g., Love & Garg, supra note 8, at 1228 (arguing that when the Executive "chooses not
to enforce a law, it is often difficult to identify a way for potential plaintiffs to challenge this
decision; there is no obvious 'case or controversy'").
192. See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012) ("Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency
action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial
review."); Nicholas Bagley, The Puzzling Presumption of Reviewability, 127 HARV. L. REV.
1285, 1286 (2014) ("The presumption in favor of judicial review of agency action is a
cornerstone of administrative law.").
193. See, e.g., Cellular Telecomms. & Internet Ass'n v. FCC, 330 F.3d 502, 507 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
To the extent the Commission is engaged in statutory interpretation, its decision is also
reviewed under Chevron. See id. In addition, although difficult standing issues occasionally
may arise, see Barron & Rakoff, supra note 5, at 319 & n.201, an agency rule depriving a
statutory requirement of legal force and effect is much more likely to result in a justiciable
"case or controversy" than a simple nonenforcement decision. For one, the agency's decision
to exercise forbearance authority comes in the shape of a discrete rule with direct legal
consequences, making it easier to trace any resulting harm to individual parties capable of
seeking judicial relief. See id. ("[T]he decision to dispense with a statutory requirement will,
in a broad range of cases, supply enough potentially discretely injured parties to deprive
agency officials- if well advised-of confidence that exercises of big waiver authority should
be assumed to be immune from judicial second-guessing."). And a party who petitions an
agency to remove a statutory requirement and whose request is denied should have clear






Judicial review is not the only way to discipline agency decision making.
Since the Reagan Administration, OIRA, which is part of the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB), has subjected all significant rules
promulgated by executive branch agencies to cost-benefit review.1 94 The
original impetus for centralized cost-benefit review was distrust of agency
power and, in particular, "a fear that, if left unchecked, regulatory agencies
would consistently regulate 'too much.""95 But recent work also has
highlighted how cost-benefit review might usefully be applied to agency
deregulation or inaction.'96 More generally, review of agency rules by officials
closer to the President can be seen as a way of monitoring agency behavior and
mitigating any number of pathologies that could lead agencies to act in
'97undesirable ways.
Cost-benefit review is much more easily applied to agency forbearance
decisions than to agency deregulation through nonenforcement."s The former
will usually result in a discrete rule, the effects of which can be isolated and
studied just as with any other rule. Agency enforcement practices, by contrast,
are not so easily policed. Even concerted efforts to reduce enforcement of a
particular requirement will often take the form of a series of discrete (though
related) decisions not to prosecute. 99 In these kinds of nonenforcement
actions, it is unclear how costs and benefits could be measured in the first
194. See, e.g., Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture, and Agency
Inaction, io GEO. L.J. 1337, 1338-39 (2013). For the Obama Administration's current
approach to OIRA review, see Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. § 215 (2012).
195. Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, io6
COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1282 (2oo6).
196. See id. at 1268-80. See generally RICHARD L. REvEsz & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING
RATIONALITY: How COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND
OUR HEALTH (20o8) (arguing that proregulatory groups should make greater use of cost-
benefit analysis).
197. See, e.g., Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-Insulation Under Presidential Review, 126 HARv. L. REV.
1755, 1766-68 (2013); see also Livermore & Revesz, supra note 194, at 1361-77 (suggesting an
anticapture rationale for OIRA review). But see Michael A. Livermore, Cost-Benefit Analysis
and Agency Independence, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 609, 609 (2014) (arguing that cost-benefit
analysis in fact helps preserve agency autonomy).
19s. Independent agencies such as the FCC fall outside the OIRA review process. Scholars have
debated whether that should continue to be the case, and whether independent agencies
should incorporate more robust cost-benefit analysis into their decision making. See, e.g.,
Darla & Revesz, supra note 162, at 836-42 (arguing against the view that independent
agencies cannot be subject to OIRA review). This Article sidesteps those issues.
199. See Stephenson, supra note 148, at 137-38; Deacon, supra note 158, at 807-09.
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place. The relative lack of visibility associated with nonenforcement practices
compounds this difficulty, making it easier for agencies to hide policymaking
from potential reviewers. Thus, by shifting agency policymaking away from
nonenforcement, statutorily authorized forbearance may make it easier for the
executive branch to engage in cost-benefit review of administrative
deregulation.
C. Addressing Concerns
This Section addresses some possible critiques of forbearance authority. An
overarching theme of the Section is that the objections lodged against negative
delegations are just variants on traditional concerns associated with more
familiar types of delegation. In many cases, these objections in fact apply with
less force to negative delegations than to positive ones. Thus, those already
comfortable with delegation to agencies generally should have no particular
reason to fear the growth of forbearance authority. More interestingly,
opponents of broad delegations to agencies may actually prefer forbearance-
type delegation in a world - such as our own - where positive delegations are
"here to stay."2o Opponents of delegation generally should support negative
delegation as a second-best solution because banning negative delegations may
simply increase the law's already heavy reliance on positive ones."
1. Agency Power
One objection to an agency forbearance authority is that it simply places
too much power -or perhaps power of a too dramatic sort -in the hands of an
agency. As noted above, critics of forbearance have called such negative
delegations "astonishing" and have questioned whether allowing agencies such
a power comports with the constitutional separation of powers." This
criticism echoes Clinton, where the Court described the ability to deprive
statutory requirements of legal force and effect as a power "to enact, to amend,
or to repeal statutes" that the Constitution does not allow the Executive to
wield."
But if one steps back and considers more carefully what is involved in
forbearance, the power is not at all "astonishing." In many ways it is a tamer
zoo. Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty To Supervise, 124 YALE L.J. 1836, 1895 (2015).
201. Cf ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE SYSTEM OF THE CONSTITUTION 29-37 (2011) (examining certain
"second-best arguments in American constitutional theory").
202. See supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text.




version of the traditional, positive-type delegation that is firmly established as
a matter of constitutional law.
First, as a formal matter, to say that forbearance authority allows a
legislative "repeal" (or "modification" or "unmaking") of the statute Congress
has passed fundamentally mischaracterizes forbearance. Since the negative-
lawmaking delegation is part of the statute, action pursuant to such a
delegation is an implementation of the statute, not a repeal or modification of
it. Here is a slightly different way to approach the point: when Congress
simultaneously enacts a requirement and makes it defeasible at the agency's
discretion, the characteristic of defeasibility already has been built into the
requirement as passed. It is thus incorrect to posit that when an agency uses its
authority, it is engaged in a "repeal" of the statute that requires the
constitutional processes of bicameralism and presentment.0 4
It still could be argued that, at least as a functional matter, an express
forbearance authority is simply "too big" an authority to vest in an agency. But
is that right? Certainly it is correct that, from the standpoint of agency power, a
statute containing a negative-lawmaking delegation allows the agency more
power than a relatively detailed statute that does not contain such a delegation.
However, that is often the wrong comparison, for Congress will always have
the option of instead enacting a garden-variety positive-type delegation that
specifies few, if any, details in advance. In terms of agency power, negative-
lawmaking delegations in fact occupy a middle ground between completely
specified statutes and more open-ended positive delegations. Recall, for
instance, the 1993 mobile-wireless amendments to the Communications Act."s
Congress could have written a statute providing that the FCC "shall have the
authority to regulate commercial mobile services to promote competition and
protect the public interest." What Congress did instead was to presumptively
apply a number of requirements -such as entry and exit certifications and
tariffing obligations - to commercial mobile services and then allow the agency
to forbear from applying some of those requirements by regulation. As a result,
the agency had at its disposal a narrower set of options than if Congress had
allowed the Commission to regulate on a blank slate.
204. Moreover, under normal administrative-law principles, the agency has presumptive
authority to reverse itself and reimpose the requirement as it sees fit, something it obviously
could not do if forbearance were a true statutory repeal. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations,
Inc., ss6 U.S. 502, 514 (2009).
20s. See supra notes 105-107 and accompanying text.
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2. "Unmaking" Deals
Another objection to negative delegations is that such delegations allow an
agency to unmake deals that were necessary to strike the legislative
compromise that resulted in the requirement at issue." 6 This objection
similarly crumbles on closer inspection.
First, as a purely formal matter, to say that agency action pursuant to an
expressly delegated authority undermines the deal struck by Congress makes
little sense. After all, the "deal" includes the negative delegation. The risk that
the agency would use the delegation as authorized was built into the "deal."
The objection appears to assume that the compromise is reflected in the
specific language of the requirement and that the delegation is somehow
external to that compromise." But the delegation is just as much a part of the
overall statute as any other statutory language, and one cannot assume that
prohibiting Congress from making the delegation of forbearance authority
would have resulted in the same statute otherwise. Quite the contrary. In the
absence of agency authority to forbear from a particular requirement, the
resulting statute might have been less favorable toward the interests that
lobbied in favor of that requirement. At the extreme, the statute might not have
even passed.
Perhaps, however, the objection reflects a more nuanced concern along the
following lines. Every delegation involves the risk of what political scientists
refer to as bureaucratic drift in which the agency pursues outcomes different
from those preferred by the principal (here, Congress)."' This risk may be
heightened for negative-lawmaking delegations, as agents can "cancel" the
instructions they receive from Congress.
But the intuition that negative delegations create greater principal-agent
problems than positive ones is empirically untested and, for reasons similar to
2o6. See, e.g., Kitchen, supra note 4, at 596 ("Executive negation of statutory text denies to
legislatures the specific bargains that were the products of hard-fought compromises.").
207. This premise might have greater force in some contexts, particularly where Congress
delegates a forbearance authority that cuts broadly across different regulatory contexts. For
example, one negative delegation previously discussed in the literature allows the Attorney
General to render any statute inapplicable if it interferes with the construction of a border
fence along the U.S.-Mexico border. See Barron & Rakoff, supra note 5, at 289-90. However,
the objection fails in the forbearance contexts described in this Article, where both the
forbearance-like delegation and the statutory requirement subject to forbearance are closely
linked.




those discussed in Section III.C.1," unlikely to be true. Forbearance authority
is in important ways a more modest power than that more typically given to
agencies. Most important here, when Congress delegates forbearance
authority, it still sets the default regulatory regime, including the presumptive
requirements that apply to regulated entities. The agency thus has the burden
of inertia to depart from that regulatory regime, which, as argued above, must
be done through notice-and-comment processes. Moreover, just as in the
traditional case, Congress has the option to write a more or less stringent
intelligible principle to govern the exercise of agency discretion, and may place
the burden of proof on the agency (or petitioners) to satisfy that principle."
Congress can thus monitor and assess any departures from its baseline regime
and respond accordingly. All of this is reason to think that, as compared to the
positive type, negative delegations may actually mitigate rather than exacerbate
the principal-agent problems arising from delegation.
3. Congressional Shirking and Accountability
A third possible objection to negative-lawmaking delegations is that such
delegations allow Congress to shirk its responsibility and hide potentially
unpopular policymaking from public view. One form of this argument has
appeared in the popular press and takes the following general form: negative
delegations allow Congress to write laws that appear tough (and thus, by
hypothesis, please the public)." However, those laws are a mirage because
members of Congress (and, perhaps, powerful regulated entities) know that
the law will be implemented only partially. The agency tasked with
implementing the statute will, by exercising its delegated authority, grant
exceptions and lift statutory requirements. Because such agency action is-
again by hypothesis-less visible, lines of accountability will be severed and
democracy will suffer.
This argument is really just a reframing of the conventional critique of
delegation- associated with David Schoenbrod"- that delegation allows
2og. See supra Section III.C.1 (discussing why forbearance-like delegations do not necessarily put
too much power in the hands of agencies).
aio. Parties petitioning for forbearance also may have the burden of proof at the agency level. See
Verizon v. FCC, 770 F.3d 961, 967 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (upholding the FCC's determination
that the burden of proof is on the petitioner to demonstrate that forbearance meets the
statutory criteria).
2n1. See, e.g., Philip Hamburger, Can Health-Care Waivers Be Justified?, NAT'L REV. (Feb. 18,
2011, 4:oo AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/26oo8/can-health-care-waivers-be
-justified-philip-hamburger [http://perma.cc/6K3K-3RAF].
212. See SCHOENBROD, supra note 170.
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Congress to engage in "happy talk" about the laws it passes while at the same
time handing agencies the obligation to make hard choices." This argument is
also open to the same responses. Most persuasively, under the assumptions
favored by critics of delegation, voters could still hold legislators responsible
for the decision to delegate in the first place. 4 A vote for legislation containing
a delegation (including a "negative" one) signals Congress's judgment that the
delegation is in the public interest. If that turns out to be wrong, voters can
punish those who supported the law. As Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule have
argued with respect to traditional positive delegations:
If the agency performs its function poorly, citizens will hold Congress
responsible for the poor design of the agency, or for giving it too much
power or not enough, or for giving it too much money or not enough,
or for confirming bad appointments, or for creating the agency in the
first place."s
And if voters are inattentive to the details of legislation, there is no reason to
think they are more easily duped by happy talk concerning delegatory
legislation than any other kind of legislation."'
Negative delegations also may fare better than positive ones when assessed
in terms of the potential for congressional shirking. When Congress legislates
with specificity while allowing an agency to forbear from implementing some
of those detailed requirements, at least Congress is the one responsible for
setting the default policy."' Often this is not true with traditional delegation,
where Congress sets only a goal or principle and leaves agencies to fill in the
details."' Thus, it is quite plausible that even "provisional" legislation that
establishes a default policy can supply voters with more information about
Congress's performance than more open-ended legislation.
One might still object that the act of delegating forbearance authority
inherently involves the transfer of power from Congress to agencies. To the
extent Congress is seen as the more accountable actor, the critique has force
213. See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 68, at 1748-49.
214. See MASHAw, supra note 58, at 146-47; Posner & Vermeule, supra note 68, at 1748-49.
215. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 68, at 1748.
216. See MASHAW, supra note 58, at 147 ("Voters do not read bills and would have little chance of
understanding most of them if they did. Hence, legislators can selectively convey
information about legislation whether they legislate specifically or generally.").
217. See Barron & Rakoff, supra note 5, at 270 (remarking that, with negative-lawmaking
delegations, "Congress takes ownership of the first draft of a regulatory framework").
218. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474 (2001) (providing examples of




and echoes a common concern with delegation generally."' However, the point
remains that there is no reason to fear greater accountability losses with respect
to forbearance delegations than any other kind of delegation. In fact, for the
reasons just given, forbearance delegations involve more of a commitment by
Congress than the ordinary case.22
One further point bears mentioning. If Congress legislates with specificity
and does not delegate forbearance authority to an agency, it increases the
likelihood that courts might help themselves to such power. Guido Calabresi
argues that judges should rather explicitly "overrule" statutory provisions that
have become obsolete, much as a common-law judge would overrule a
precedent." Less jarringly, William Eskridge suggests that judges should
"update" statutes to reflect changed circumstances through a process of
"dynamic statutory interpretation."' Of course, agencies have an undoubted
219. See Stephenson, supra note 6o, at 291 ("One of the principal arguments in favor of a
stronger non-delegation doctrine is that it would promote political accountability by forcing
Congress to make more critical policy decisions itself, rather than shifting these decisions to
agencies .... "); see also Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petrol. Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring) (noting that nondelegation "ensures . . . that important choices
of social policy are made by Congress, the branch of our Government most responsive to the
popular will"). But see Kagan, supra note 42, at 2335 (noting that the Executive's ultimate
accountability to the entire electorate (through presidential elections) means that the
Executive may be quite responsive to the median national voter); Jerry L. Mashaw,
Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 98-
99 (1985) (sketching the accountability argument in favor of delegation); Stephenson, supra
note 148, at 135-36 ("[D]elegating authority from one elected branch (Congress) to another
one (the executive) does not entail any obvious accountability loss, unless one believes that
decisionmaking by the former inherently involves a greater degree of political accountability
than decisionmaking by the latter."). See generally SCHOENBROD, supra note 170 (mounting
an accountability-based critique of delegation). Moreover, even so-called "independent"
agencies, the heads of which may not be removed by the President without cause, remain
accountable to political actors through various means. See Pardo & Watts, supra note 58, at
432 ("[E]ven independent agencies that are insulated from direct presidential control are not
insulated from politics or from congressional control."); see also Datla & Revesz, supra note
162, at 784 ("[T]he binary distinction between independent and executive agencies is
false.").
220. See Prakash, supra note 68, at 24 ("[D]elegation of certain cancellation and modification
authority makes it possible for Congress to draft more detailed statutes and accept increased
congressional responsibility. . . .").
221. See CAIABREst, supra note 75, at 163-66.
222. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1512
(1987); see also Sunstein, supra note 76, at 423-24 (arguing that departures from statutory
text may be justified in response to, among other things, changed circumstances). In
addition, courts may be tempted to use constitutional-law doctrine to invalidate legislation
in circumstances in which an agency could otherwise exercise forbearance. See, e.g., Shelby
County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2618 (2013) ("There is no denying. . . that the conditions
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accountability advantage over courts.' Thus, when deciding whether power
should be lodged in an agency or, as a practical matter, fall instead to the
courts, accountability concerns should generally favor the agency approach.
4. Capture
Another objection to agency forbearance authority is that it facilitates
agency capture, which can be broadly defined as agency action for the benefit-
and at the behest of- a special interest, often industry.' This has sometimes
been expressed as a problem of "favoritism."s Another proregulatory variant
on the objection is that forbearance allows the Executive to achieve a kind of
backdoor deregulation, in which statutory requirements designed to benefit the
public are eroded over time."
Putting aside whether there is a problem of agency capture generally,' the
capture critique of negative delegations is unpersuasive on several counts. First,
to the extent that it treats deregulation as synonymous with industry interest,
the critique is mistaken. Indeed, modem capture theory in its original form
stressed how industries used regulation itself- not the lack of it-to advance
their interests."' Thus, the prescription for solving agency capture was often
that originally justified [the preclearance] measures no longer characterize voting in the
covered jurisdictions."); see also infra Section IV.B (exploring the case in greater depth).
223. See Lemos, supra note 58, at 449-50; Pardo & Watts, supra note 58, at 433; see also Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984) ("While agencies
are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely
appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make such policy choices -
resolving the competing interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve,
or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged with the administration of the
statute in light of everyday realities.").
224. See Daniel Carpenter & David Moss, Introduction to PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE:
SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND How To LIMIT IT 1, 13-14 (Daniel Carpenter & David
Moss eds., 2014).
225. HAMBURGER, supra note 12, at 127; see Kitchen, supra note 4, at 584 ("Negative lawmaking by
the Executive . . . is also problematic because it allows for favoritism and unequal
application of the law.").
226. Cf Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 236 (describing the "concern for statutory erosion" when the
Executive removes statutory requirements designed to benefit the less privileged).
227. For one interesting take on capture in the administrative state, see Steven P. Croley, Public
Interested Regulation, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 7 (2000).
228. See George J. Stigler, The Theory ofEconomic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 3
(1971) ("A central thesis of this paper is that, as a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry
and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit."); see also BRUCE M. OWEN & RONALD
BRAEUTIGAM, THE REGULATION GAME: STRATEGIC USE OF THE ADMIISTRATIVE PROCESS 2




deregulation. On this view, to remedy capture, agencies should abolish
regulations that powerful parties could use to suppress competition and
innovation, such as entry requirements and tariffing obligations." These are
exactly the sorts of regulations that the FCC, one of the few remaining
industry-specific competition agencies, has targeted with its forbearance
authority.
More recent analyses have accepted that capture can lead to agency inaction
or deregulation as well as to regulation.230 Thus, negative delegations might
seem to grant agencies a potent tool for engaging in action motivated by this
"corrosive" form of capture, eroding not only the agency's own administrative
regulations, but also statutory requirements."'
This argument has a ring of plausibility, but whether negative delegations
facilitate corrosive capture is uncertain. Negative delegations may actually
combat some of the ills associated with such capture. Imagine a relatively
public-spirited legislature that wants to protect the public from air pollution
but is unsure of exactly how to do so.' Such uncertainty is a classic reason the
legislature might delegate policymaking authority to an expert agency.
However, the legislature may also fear that the agency will underregulate,
perhaps because of capture. One option in such circumstances is to write
stringent but crude requirements and allow the agency to depart downwards -
that is, to grant the agency forbearance authority. That option allows the
legislature to set relatively heavy-handed default rules and place the burdens of
inertia, explanation, and proof on the party seeking relief from those
requirements; at the same time, the legislature can preserve some of the
benefits associated with agency expertise. 33 From the perspective of agency
capture theory, such an option appears to be superior to delegations of the
229. See Richard A. Posner, The Concept of Regulatory Capture: A Short, Inglorious History, in
PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE, supra note 224, at 49, 52-53.
23o. See Carpenter & Moss, supra note 224, at 16 ("A captured policy process can also result in less
public interest-serving regulation, and (as a consequence) reduce or eliminate regulatory
costs that fall on industry."); Livermore & Revesz, supra note 194, at 1355 ("Although it is
possible that special-interest influence may sometimes lead to overregulation, it is at least as
likely that too little regulation will be the result.").
231. See Carpenter & Moss, supra note 224, at 16.
232. If the legislature and agency are equally motivated by special interests, the capture critique
of agency action loses its normative force as an argument against delegation.
233. This argument shares some similarities with the "deck-stacking" hypothesis articulated by
McNollGast. They argue that Congress can structure the administrative process to favor
certain interests, including the public's. See McNollGast, Structure and Process, supra note
178, at 444 ("[T]he structure and process of an agency should stack the deck in favor of the
groups who, among those significantly affected by the policy, are also favored constituents
of the coalition that caused the policy to be adopted.").
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positive variety, which allow agencies to achieve underregulation through mere
inaction.3 4
Such a dynamic actually appears to have motivated Congress in its efforts
to address hazardous air pollutant (HAP) regulation."s Earlier environmental-
regulation regimes allowed the EPA to determine which pollutants would be
regulated as HAPs, but the agency had been slow to identify pollutants as
HAPs.23 In response, Congress switched the default rule, subjecting a laundry
list of pollutants to regulation while allowing the EPA to remove any of those
pollutants from the list." The resulting regime has not worked perfectly. 3 8
However, it does show the potential for forbearance to facilitate tougher, rather
than weaker, legislation and to combat the potential for corrosive agency
capture.239
There is always a concern that an agency may use its delegated authority to
advance special interests, just as there is a concern that Congress will use its
legislative authority to do so. But negative delegations to agencies do not
necessarily present a special challenge in this regard. Indeed, in the right
circumstances, negative delegations may be able to reduce the effects of capture
on the administrative state.
IV. APPLICATIONS
The prior Parts have sought to establish the general propriety of
forbearance-like delegations. They have argued that, as a normative and legal
matter, there is nothing particularly troubling about forbearance as opposed to
the more familiar agency authority to fill in the details of a statutory scheme.
This Part asks a slightly different question: as a policy matter, when should
234. See Livermore & Revesz, supra note 194, at 1355 ("[S]pecial-interest influence could just as
easily lead to underregulation as overzealousness."). Negative delegations are also superior
to other forms of executive inaction or deregulation, such as nonenforcement, because these
alternatives are harder to monitor for evidence of capture. See supra Section III.B.2.
235. See supra notes 110-117 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 110-113 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 114-117 and accompanying text.
238. See Livermore & Revesz, supra note 194, at 1378 ("Regulation of hazardous air pollutants
under the Clean Air Act took the EPA decades, even after Congress included several action-
forcing provisions in the 1990 amendments to that statute.").
239. The reasons for the failure of the pre-199o HAP regime in particular are varied. But those
reasons included the EPA's unwillingness to impose potentially draconian requirements on
industry, as would apparently have been required once the agency decided to designate a
pollutant as hazardous. See Michael E. Herz, The Air Toxics Dilemma: Whither Section 112?,




Congress include an administrative forbearance authority? The guidance
provided is tentative and incomplete; after all, the Article suggests throughout
that Congress generally should be able to decide when to include negative
delegations in statutes, just as it does with "normal," positive delegations.
Nevertheless, as with any type of delegation, there are good and bad reasons
that Congress might give agencies forbearance authority. Section IV.A briefly
considers some of those reasons. Section 1V.B then fleshes out the analysis by
showing how forbearance authority might have helped resolve two recent
regulatory controversies.
A. The Promise (and Limits) ofForbearance
1. When Should Congress Give Agencies Forbearance Authority?
The most obvious context in which forbearance might be beneficial is when
Congress writes statutory requirements, expects that the need for those
requirements may recede over time, and predicts that an agency will have
better information about-and be more likely to adjust-the statutory
framework as needed. Because Congress may be uncertain about when or even
whether statutory obligations will become obsolete, other statutory tools - such
as sunset provisions-might be too crude. In the 1996 Telecommunications
Act, for example, Congress had hoped that competition in local telephone
markets might someday obviate the need for heavy-handed, prescriptive
regulation, but it did not know when that day would come, or if it ever would.
The FCC seemed better positioned to make that determination. This example
highlights that in substantive areas of law characterized by rapid technological
change, statutes might be particularly likely to become outdated.24o However,
it would be a mistake to conclude that statutory obsolescence is a challenge
unique to the regulation of high-tech markets. Indeed, it may be an enduring
feature of the administrative state."
Congress also might beneficially use forbearance when it believes that the
statutes it writes are currently overbroad but wants - for one reason or
another -to set a proregulatory baseline instead of letting an agency build from
the ground up. The legislative response to HAPs is an instructive example of
240. See, e.g., Derek E. Bambauer, Rules, Standards, and Geeks, 5 BROOK. J. CoRP. FIN. & COM. L.
49, 49 (2oo) (noting that most scholars find flexibly applied standards superior for the
regulation of technology).
241. See generally CAIABREsi, supra note 75 (discussing the problem of statutory obsolescence);
Freeman & Spence, supra note 7 (same).
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this approach.2" Congress tried letting the EPA craft the list of pollutants to be
regulated as hazardous but, because of capture or otherwise," the agency did a
bad job.' Congress then flipped the baseline by specifying which pollutants
were to be regulated, and it allowed the agency to subtract from the list if the
substances included did not actually pose health risks.2"
Congress might also anticipate that future developments or information
might subject new entities to regulation under existing statutory requirements
that were not designed to address these novel entities. As discussed above,
granting an agency a forbearance option can potentially enable sound
regulation in such circumstances and can also allow the agency to deal with
uncertainty that arises while it decides what to do.24 The Congresses that
wrote the Communications Act only dimly foresaw the rise and importance of
broadband Internet, and so it is not surprising that the Act as written applies
rather crudely to it." 7 The history of greenhouse-gas regulation under the
Clean Air Act, discussed below,"8 provides another example. Giving
forbearance power to an agency preserves some amount of flexibility to adapt
old regulatory structures to changing environments.
All of the above scenarios may be more likely to occur in statutes where a
threshold definitional question-say, whether a product is a "drug," a
substance is a "pollutant," or a service is "telecommunications" - triggers broad
statutory consequences. Because so much turns on a single determination, such
situations likely pose a threat of overbreadth that forbearance may mitigate. It
is thus not surprising that many of the existing examples of forbearance are
contained within such statutes.
2. The Limits ofForbearance
Finally, a word about when we might be wary of Congress including a
forbearance-like delegation. With any kind of delegation, Congress sometimes
242. See supra text accompanying notes n1o-117; see also supra Section III.C.4 (discussing the
regulation of HAPs).
243. See supra note 239 and accompanying text (discussing reasons for the failure of the HAP
regime).
244. See supra notes 110-113 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 114-117 and accompanying text.
246. See supra Sections II.C, II.D.
247. See Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, 19 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 1, 2 (2005) (noting
that Congress "largely failed to take the Internet into consideration when enacting the
Telecommunications Act of 1996," leading to uncertainty regarding how the Internet fit into
the "existing regulatory regime").




may not appear to be harnessing the advantages associated with agency
decision making; instead, it may be engaged in political buck-passing "in an
attempt to shift responsibility for the negative impacts of law to other
governmental branches."" 9 That buck-passing concern raises a question: in
what situations might we be more skeptical of Congress including a
forbearance provision in a statute? At least two dimensions to the answer
warrant discussion here.
First, as a matter of constitutional law, this Article's analysis suggests that
judges should rarely strike down forbearance provisions. Indeed, judges should
invalidate negative delegations no more frequently than they invalidate
traditional positive delegations, which are almost always upheld because the
strong form of the nondelegation doctrine is essentially moribund.so The
dilution of the nondelegation doctrine has occurred because of judicial
administrability concerns that disrupt any clean attempt to separate delegations
passed for good reasons from those passed for bad2s' or to judge whether a
particular delegation is simply too sweeping for purposes of the intelligible-
principle doctrine."' Thus, outside of "extreme cases" where there appears to
be no good reason to delegate,"' courts should not nullify forbearance
delegations as long as they contain an intelligible principle, which can be quite
broad.2 s"
Second, however, to say that courts should not strike down forbearance
provisions is not to say that forbearance provisions do not raise normative
concerns in some circumstances. For one, the judicial administrability concerns
just mentioned may leave certain norms underenforced. 2" Underenforcement
249. Baker & Krawiec, supra note 61, at 664.
250. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
251. See Mark Seidenfeld, Pyrrhic Political Penalties: Why the Public Would Lose Under the "Penalty
Default Canon," 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 724, 725 (2004) ("[A]ny analysis that depends on
reading legislative history to find the motive of a multibody group like Congress is going to
raise difficult questions about what it means for a group to have a motive and precisely how
the courts are to determine what that motive is.").
2s2. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (noting judicial administrability concerns that
prevent a more robust version of the nondelegation doctrine).
253. Barron & Rakoff, supra note 5, at 318.
254. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474 (2oo1) (collecting examples of
lawful delegations that survived the intelligible-principle test despite the fact that Congress
supplied a broad principle to constrain the agency's discretion).
255. See Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 315, 338 (2000) ("The
difficulty of drawing lines between prohibited and permitted delegations makes it
reasonable to conclude that for the most part, the ban on unacceptable delegations is a
judicially underenforced norm, and properly so."); cf Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure:
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is especially concerning where, based on the breadth of the forbearance
provision itself and the surrounding circumstances, there does not appear to be
a nexus between the reasons for the forbearance decision and the underlying
purposes of the statutory requirements from which the agency will forbear.
Suppose, for example, that in a future Republican administration, a
Republican Congress were to pass the "Obamacare Forbearance Act,"
providing that the President (or an executive branch agency, such as the
Department of Health and Human Services) could permanently forbear from
any provision of the Affordable Care Act, provided that forbearance was in the
public interest.2s6 Imagine further that circumstances demonstrated that
support for the forbearance provision was fueled by political opposition to the
law itself, and not by a belief that the law's purposes would be effectuated best
by allowing an agency to tailor the Act's requirements. In such circumstances,
we might be concerned that the forbearance provision in question was a kind of
backdoor repeal that had been designed merely to gain some relative political
advantage.s'
This disjunction between the constitutionally permissible and the
normatively desirable suggests a role for subconstitutional rules of
interpretation. Indeed, scholars have long invoked certain "nondelegation
canons" to deal with normative issues raised by broad delegations to
agencies.8 Two rules of interpretation may be particularly useful for
forbearance-like delegations.
The first rule of interpretation underlies the Supreme Court's opinion
in MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. AT&T: an agency may not exercise
forbearance authority unless Congress has granted it that authority using
relatively clear language."' That is, a forbearance power may not be lightly
implied, at least where forbearance would result in a "fundamental revision" of
the regulatory scheme enacted by Congress.2o Although MCI was murky
The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1212 (1978)
(discussing the underenforcement of constitutional norms).
256. Thanks to Cass Sunstein for raising this particular example in conversation.
257. Similar scenarios might readily be imagined in other contexts. Indeed, this is one way to
interpret the Line Item Veto Act. See Lessig, supra note 16, at 1663 (arguing against
delegations, like the Line Item Veto Act, where "Congress has so plainly liquidated its policy
choice, and empowered the President plainly to negate it").
258. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 255, at 315 ("[N]ondelegation canons are far preferable to the
old nondelegation doctrine, because they are subject to principled judicial application, and
because they do not threaten to unsettle so much of modern government."); see also Indus.
Union Dep't v. Am. Petrol. Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 646 (1980) (plurality opinion) (reading the
statute so as to avoid a "sweeping delegation of legislative power").





about the basis for this rule, this Article provides some arguments in its favor.
When Congress expressly includes a forbearance provision in the statute, the
"unmaking deals" and principal-agent objections discussed above are
considerably weaker, as Congress's express inclusion of the provision makes
clear that it intends the forbearance power to be part of the legislative package.
Requiring Congress to be explicit about the power it gives to the agency also
undercuts the "backdoor-repeal" objection by making clear to outsiders that
Congress may in fact be authorizing the dismantling of a particular law.
The second rule of interpretation relates to the nexus between the reasons
to forbear and the underlying purposes of the statute. If possible, when
reviewing agency forbearance decisions, courts should presume that Congress
intends the agency to consider the underlying purposes of the statute when
deciding whether to forbear. 6 ' Of course, when Congress has required the
forbearing agency to consider a list of specific factors that relate to the purposes
of the statute in question, this likely will not be difficult. For example, the
FCC's forbearance provision requires the Commission to consider factors
related to competition and consumers, the twin aims of most of the
Communication Act's protections.6' But if Congress speaks in broader
language-say, allowing an agency to forbear when it is in the "public
interest" -courts should still presume that the agency's decision should be
guided (though perhaps not exclusively) by the purposes underlying the
statute. Such a presumption would require agencies to articulate more clearly
how their decisions advance the goals of the statute as a whole. It would
minimize the dangers associated with a runaway Executive negating the will of
Congress. And it would reduce the risk that Congress and the Executive could
act in tandem to achieve a "backdoor repeal" of a duly enacted statute.
B. Examples
This Section imagines the role a forbearance authority might have played -
had one been held by an agency- in two recent controversies: first, the debate
over the continued validity of the VRA's preclearance provisions, and second,
the debate over the EPA's regulations regarding greenhouse-gas emissions. A
statutory forbearance power could have led to better regulatory outcomes in
both controversies and might have saved the programs in question from
(partial) judicial invalidation.
261. This is a slight adaptation of the "fundamental canon" that individual statutory provisions
should be read "with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme." FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000).
26z. See supra note 73 and accompanying text (reproducing the provision).
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1. The Voting Rights Act
Passed in 1965 as a response to decades of black disenfranchisement, the
VRA has several key provisions. The Act categorically bars voting practices
intended to deny voting rights on the basis of race.14 It also suspends certain
kinds of "test[s] or device[s]" 6 in "covered jurisdictions," which were
determined according to a formula contained in section 4(b).26 As relevant
here, section 5 of the Act subjected those covered jurisdictions to a
"preclearance" regime.6' Under that regime, covered jurisdictions were
required to seek permission for changes to their voting laws from the
Department of Justice or a three-judge panel of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia; permission would be granted if the covered jurisdiction
demonstrated that the change had neither the purpose nor effect of abridging
the right to vote based on race.68
Section 4(b) of the original 1965 Act determined which jurisdictions were
"covered" based on whether they had been using a forbidden test or device and
had less than fifty percent voter registration or turnout in the November 1964
election.26 As originally enacted, the preclearance provisions of the VRA were
set to expire in five years, 270 reflecting the fact that, in the Supreme Court's
words, they were from the beginning "intended to be temporary."27 ' In
addition, and as fleshed out by subsequent amendments, otherwise covered
jurisdictions could "bail out" of section 5's requirements under certain
conditions.
a63. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 52 U.S.C.).
264. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 2, 79 Stat. 437, 437 (amended 1982).
Section 2 was later amended to expand its reach. See Samuel Issacharoff, Is Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act a Victim ofIts Own Success?, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1710, 1718 & n.39 (2004).
265. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-no, 5 4(a), 79 Stat. 437, 438 (amended 1982). In
1970, Congress made the ban on tests and devices nationwide. Shelby County v. Holder, 133
S. Ct. 2612, 2620 (2013).
266. § 4 (b), 79 Stat. 437 at 438, invalidated by Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
267. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-n1o, 5 5, 79 Stat. 437, 439 (amended 20o6).
268. Id.
269. § 4 (b), 79 Stat. 437 at 438.
270. § 4(a), 79 Stat. 437 at 438.
271. Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2620.
272. See 52 U.S.C. § 10303(a)(1)(A)-(F) (2012). As Nathaniel Persily has explained, the bailout
provision "basically require[s] the covered jurisdiction to prove to the U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia that in the previous ten years it has not violated the voting




Congress reenacted the VRA in 1970, 1975, 1982, and 2006, extending the
preclearance provisions long past their original five-year expiration date." The
1970 and 1975 reauthorizations updated the Act's coverage formula to include
election data from the 1968 and 1972 elections, but they otherwise left the
formula unchanged.' Subsequent reauthorizations did not alter the coverage
formula either.27s By the late 2000S, covered jurisdictions -which included
much of the South-were still determined based on their characteristics some
forty years prior.
Scholars have found much to criticize about the Supreme Court's decision
in Shelby County v. Holder, which concluded that the preclearance scheme -or,
more accurately, the statute's coverage formula - had become
unconstitutional. 6 What cannot be doubted, however, is that America's racial
politics looked much different in 2013 than in 1965.2' This fact mattered to
Shelby County's five-member majority. As pointed out by Chief Justice Roberts,
in many jurisdictions still covered by section 5, black and white voting rates
were near parity.' And some evidence suggested that at least as of 2004,
voting disparities were greatest in certain northern states that were not
required to seek preclearance. 79 For the majority, the fact that Congress had,
in the face of these facts, acted "as if nothing had changed" sealed the Act's
fate.2so As the Court explained, "Our country has changed, and ... Congress
must ensure that the legislation it passes to remedy that problem speaks to
current conditions."
affirmative steps to prevent potential VRA violations and has included minorities in the
apparatus of election administration." Nathaniel Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls of the New
Voting Rights Act, 117 YALE L.J. 174, 212 (2007).
273. See Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 262o-21.
274. See id. at 2620.
275. Id. at 2620-21. For criticism of the Court's decision, see, for example, Ellen D. Katz, What
Was Wrong with the Record?, 12 ELECTION L.J. 329 (2013); and Leah M. Litman, Inventing
Equal Sovereignty, 114 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016).
276. Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2631.
277. See generally Issacharoff, supra note 264 (describing the changes in voting rights following
the passage of, and perhaps because of, the VRA).
278. Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2625 (citing Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557
U.S. 193, 203-04 (2009)).
279. See Shelby County v. Holder, 679 F. 3 d 848, 891 (D.C. Cit. 2012) (Williams, J., dissenting)
(singling out Massachusetts, Washington, and Colorado as "the worst offenders"), rev'd, 133
S. Ct. 2612 (2013). But see Persily, supra note 272, at 196 ("Turnout rates in the covered and
uncovered jurisdictions do not differ consistently.").
280. Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2626.
281. Id. at 2631.
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The difficult counterfactual is whether a more agency-focused scheme-
one that involved, at least in part, a congressional delegation of the power to
remove jurisdictions from section 5's scope-would have done a better job
addressing the concerns that ultimately led the Court to invalidate the VRA's
coverage formula." The germ of such a solution is already found in the Act's
"bailout" mechanism. 8 But that mechanism, besides lodging bailout authority
in the courts and not in an agency, proved too rigid to provide meaningful
relief in most cases.* There are reasons to think that a more flexible
delegation, in place of the bailout mechanism and the continued cycle of
congressional reauthorization, might have blunted some of the main criticisms
of the Act. The main impediment to changing the coverage formula itself was
political -namely, a fear that "a debate over the coverage formula . . . would
have led to the complete unraveling of the bill."8' Instead of reauthorizing the
Act for a finite period of time and including a bailout mechanism, however,
Congress instead could have reenacted the Act and given an agency authority
to designate a covered jurisdiction as no longer subject to the preclearance
process. This amendment might have allowed Congress to sidestep the
thorniest debates about the VRA while also creating a mechanism to address
the coverage formula's purported overinclusiveness in light of changed
circumstances.
By granting an agency the power to alter the coverage formula, Congress
could have potentially captured some of the benefits associated with agency
decision making surveyed above.8' An agency tasked with forbearance
authority could have naturally developed expertise bearing on whether the
preclearance regime had become unnecessary or counterproductive in a
particular locality. An agency-focused solution also would have been more
flexible than either the sunset-and-reauthorization regime, which depended on
282. I leave aside the question of whether an existing agency, including the Department of
Justice, or a new agency would be the appropriate holder of such authority.
z83. See supra note 272 and accompanying text.
284. See Persily, supra note 272, at 213 (noting that "[t]he infrequency of bailout in the last
twenty-five years may indicate that the requirements for bailout are simply too stringent,"
but also detailing other reasons the bailout mechanism might have been underused).
285. Id. at 208-09.
286. Indeed, some advocated for expanded bailout opportunities on similar grounds. See, e.g., An
Introduction to the Expiring Provisions of the Voting Rights Act and Legal Issues Relating to
Reauthorization: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, lo9th Cong. 10, 14 (20o6)
(statements of Richard L. Hasen, William H. Hannon Distinguished Professor, Loyola Law
School, and Samuel Issacharoff, Reiss Professor of Constitutional Law, New York
University School of Law).




Congress, or the Supreme Court's ultimate nullification of the Act's entire
coverage formula. With forbearance authority, the agency could have more
quickly reversed course and reimposed preclearance requirements if
backsliding occurred.
2. The EPA and Climate Change
Forbearance authority also might have played a critical role in the
controversy over the EPA's regulation of greenhouse-gas emissions. That saga
began with the Supreme Court's decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, which held
(among other things) that greenhouse gases count as "air pollutants" for
purposes of the Clean Air Act's mobile-source (i.e., motor-vehicle)
provisions.'" On remand several years later, the EPA ruled that greenhouse-
gas emissions from mobile sources "may reasonably be anticipated to endanger
both public health and welfare,"8' a determination many saw as the inevitable
result of the Court's holding in Massachusetts.29o As soon as the EPA made an
endangerment finding, as it did on remand, emissions of greenhouse gases
automatically became subject to a comprehensive set of rules governing
emissions of such air pollutants from automobiles."
The EPA's regulation of mobile-source emissions also triggered the
regulation of greenhouse gases under several other parts of the Clean Air Act,
two of which proved especially relevant.' First, under the Prevention of
Significant Deterioration (PSD) program, stationary sources emitting large
amounts of pollutants regulated elsewhere under the Act are subject to onerous
288. 549 U.S. 497, 528 (2007).
28g. Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section
202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66496, 66523 (Dec. 15, 2009) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. ch. i).
290. See, e.g., Kirti Datla, Note, The Tailoring Rule: Mending the Conflict Between Plain Text and
Agency Resource Constraints, 86 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1989, 1997 (2011) (arguing that "the Court's
narrow limitation of the grounds available to EPA to justify a second denial of the
rulemaking petition on remand made it almost inevitable that EPA would" issue an
endangerment finding).
291. See Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel
Economy Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 25324, 25396 (May 7, 2010) (to be codified in scattered
parts of 4o and 49 C.F.R.).
292. See Dala, supra note 290, at 1998 ("Under EPA's interpretation of its existing regulations,
once it began regulating greenhouse gas emissions from mobile sources, it acquired a
nondiscretionary duty under its own longstanding regulations to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions from stationary sources through two permitting programs: the Prevention of
Significant Deterioration (PSD) program and the Title V program.").
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preconstruction permitting requirements.293 Such sources include "any
stationary source with the potential to emit 250 tons per year of 'any air
pollutant' (or ioo tons per year for certain types of sources)."29 4 Second, Title
V of the Act requires "major sources" -defined as sources having the potential
to emit one hundred tons or more per year of "any air pollutant"-to obtain
comprehensive operating permits 29s that "facilitate compliance and
enforcement by consolidating into a single document all of a facility's
obligations under the Act. ",6
The EPA's determination that greenhouse gases were regulated pollutants
for purposes of mobile-source regulation thus required the agency to regulate
greenhouse gases under the PSD and Title V provisions as well, or so the
agency ruled.19 7 But the EPA faced a problem. Because greenhouse gases are
emitted at much higher levels than are "classic" pollutants, the statutory
triggers for the PSD and Title V programs would pull in an enormous number
of new stationary sources -estimated at over six million, including many
smaller, nonindustrial sources -resulting in "undue costs for sources and
impossible administrative burdens for permitting authorities.",,8 The EPA
thus decided to "tailor" those triggers, subjecting only those otherwise
unregulated sources emitting at least one hundred thousand tons of
greenhouse gases to eventual regulation under the PSD program and Title V,
with the possibility of lowering that threshold at a later date.' 9 That
determination exempted many sources facially subject to regulation under the
Clean Air Act from the Act's scope.
The appeal from the EPA's greenhouse-gas regulations eventually reached
the Supreme Court in Utility Air Regulatory Group (UARG) v. EPA.3 oo In an
opinion authored by Justice Scalia, who had dissented in Massachusetts, the
Court vacated the EPA's treatment of stationary sources that would have been
293. See 42 U.S.C. 5§ 7470-7492 (2012).
294. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA (UA.RG), 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2435 (2014) (quoting 42 U.S.C.
5 74791(1))-
295. See 42 U.S.C. 5 7661a(a)-(c) (2012).
296. UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2436.
297. See Reconsideration of Interpretation of Regulations That Determine Pollutants Covered by
Clean Air Act Permitting Programs, 75 Fed. Reg. 17004, 17007 (Apr. 2, 2010) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. pts. 50, 51, 70, 71).
298. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed.
Reg. 31514, 31547 (June 3, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. SI, 52, 70, 71).
299. See id. at 31523-24.




unregulated under the Act but for their greenhouse-gas emissions."' The
Court reasoned that the EPA was correct that regulating greenhouse gases from
sources emitting amounts exceeding the statutory thresholds would have
created intolerable and indeed absurd results.o2 However, the Court said, that
did not mean that the EPA had authority to "tailor" those thresholds as it saw
fit. Indeed, Justice Scalia described this kind of tailoring authority as a power
"to alter [the Act's] requirements and to establish with the force of law that
otherwise-prohibited conduct will not violate the Act."3 o3 The Court then
suggested that the intolerable and absurd results stemming from EPA's
regulatory efforts meant that the EPA's interpretation of air pollutant as
encompassing greenhouse gases in the context of the PSD and Title V
programs was unreasonable.304 The Court thus invalidated that interpretation,
finding that the EPA went beyond its statutorily delegated authority in reading
the phrase air pollutant-at least as used in the Clean Air Act's PSD and Title V
provisions - to include greenhouse gases.os
UARG was a curious case. In Massachusetts, the Court held that its
interpretation of air pollutant was mandated in the context of mobile-source
regulation, but that interpretation was affirmativelyforbidden in other statutory
contexts.30 6 Nevertheless, the EPA's chosen solution-effectively rewriting the
statute to exempt certain sources - suffered from its own infirmities, most
notably the lack of any clear source of statutory authority to do so. As Justice
Scalia pointed out, an agency's general powers do not "include a power to
revise clear statutory terms that turn out not to work in practice."30 7
A forbearance-like statutory authority to remove the Clean Air Act's
requirements for certain categories of sources, had one been available, might
have provided a straightforward solution to the conundrum faced by both the
EPA and the courts following Massachusetts. Indeed, the Court's opinion in
UARG can be read to endorse just such a power.3os By wielding it, the EPA
could have simultaneously recognized greenhouse gases to be "pollutants"
301. See id. at 2449. The Court left in place the EPA's treatment of so-called "anyway" sources,
which were already subject to regulation under the PSD and Title V programs because of
their emissions of non-greenhouse-gas pollutants. See id. at 2447-49.
302. See id. at 2443.
303. Id. at 2445 (emphasis omitted).
304. See id. at 2442-44.
305. See id.
306. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528-30 (2007).
307. UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2446.
3o8. See id. (stating that "agenc[ies] may adopt policies to prioritize" statutory responsibilities
"within the bounds established by Congress").
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wherever that term appeared in the statute while blunting the extreme results
that rendered this interpretation unreasonable in the Court's eyes. The agency
thus could have created a regulatory regime that was more rational, coherent,
and protective of the environment than the one left in the wake of UARG's
holding.
CONCLUSION
This Article elaborates the normative and constitutional case for
administrative forbearance authority, which empowers agencies to deprive
statutory provisions of their legal force and effect. It makes two principal
contributions to the growing literature on such authority. First, the Article
describes how forbearance might be used and the various functions it might
perform, drawing on examples from agencies that already have a forbearance
power. Second, from that descriptive account, the Article sketches a normative
and constitutional defense of agency forbearance authority. That analysis is
necessarily comparative. It asks whether the traditional justifications for
delegation of positive policymaking authority apply to negative delegations, as
well. As this Article suggests, the answer is yes. Forbearance also might
substitute for other forms of agency action, such as nonenforcement practices,
that are for various reasons more troubling. Finally, the Article argues that the
criticisms that may be lodged against forbearance authority are actually just
generic objections to agency delegations and, in many cases, apply with less
force to delegations of the negative type. Thus, where the alternative is
delegation of the more open-ended, positive variety, even critics of delegation
generally should find some comfort in administrative forbearance.
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